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USING OUR BRAINS: WHAT COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY TEACH US ABOUT TEACHING LAW 
STUDENTS TO MAKE  ETHICAL, PROFESSIONALLY 
RESPONSIBLE, CHOICES 
Alan M. Lerner1
ABSTRACT 
 Throughout our lives, below the level of our consciousness, each of 
us develops values, intuitions, expectations, and needs that powerfully 
affect both our perceptions and our judgments.  Placed in situations in 
which we feel threatened, or which implicate our values, our brains, 
relying on those implicitly learned, emotionally weighted, memories, 
may react automatically, without reflection or the opportunity for 
reflective interdiction. We can “downshift,” to primitive, self-protective 
problem solving techniques.  Because these processes operate below the 
radar of our consciousness, automatic, “emotional” reaction, rather than 
thoughtful, reasoned analysis may drive our responses to stressful 
questions of ethics and professional responsibility.   
 1. Practice Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This paper 
has been several years in the making, and while I take full responsibility for it, I must 
express profound appreciation for the many people whose support and encouragement 
were essential to its completion. Professor Mike Rutherford, and Dr. Kathy Hirsh-Pasek 
to whom I first floated my thesis encouraged me to pursue it, despite my lack of 
scientific background, and pointed me in the direction to learn the essential background 
science.  When I had completed a draft, Dr. Hirsh-Pasek, Dr. Julio Kuperman, and Dr. 
Matthew Lattel gave me helpful suggestions for making the scientific portion more 
precise and understandable. The folks at the UCLA/University of London IALS Fifth 
International Conference on Clinical Legal Education, encouraged me to present the 
paper even though I had completed only a preliminary draft, and Dr. Hirsh-Pasek and 
Michael Pasek convinced me of the appropriateness of presenting it aided by 
PowerPoint, then taught me how to do it. My clinical colleagues at Penn, and the Mid-
Atlantic Clinicians’ Conference, and the participants in the Penn Law School Faculty 
Summer Colloquium listened patiently, and made very helpful suggestions for making 
the paper more accessible. I have been privileged to have been aided by an extraordinary 
group of research assistants over the past several years, including Steven Ebert, 
Stephanie Vogel, Elisa Behar, Tracey Sorens, Christine Hoyler, and Mariana Kuperman. 
I am especially indebted to researchers Adam Sundor, Theresa Keeley, and Nicole 
Isaacs and librarian Merle Slyhoff, without whose thoughtful and tireless work, I 
certainly would not have completed the paper before retirement. Without the assistance 
of Sylvia Bloise and Kelly Colgan-Azar, this paper would still be purely a stream of 
consciousness rambling, totally without form. 
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 Lawyers continually face complex problems of great moment to 
their clients and the community, problems which may implicate their 
own professional values.  They need to learn to address these problems 
thoughtfully and effectively while carrying out their professional 
responsibilities as representatives of their clients, officers of the judicial 
system, and public citizens, exercising both their analytical skills, and 
moral judgment.  To do so, they need to understand their own emotional 
processes and the content of their intuitions, and have the skills, and the 
confidence in their ability, to act appropriately.  Unfortunately, 
traditional legal education focuses on teaching students “legal analysis” 
of a given set of facts, in which the answer is the formation of a legal 
rule, the role of the lawyer is to achieve the client’s stated goal, and 
other values are, at best, minimally relevant.   
This paper analyzes recent discoveries in cognitive science and 
social psychology that explain the brain’s learning and problem solving 
mechanisms, and applies that scientific knowledge to demonstrate why 
traditional legal education may actually impair the ability to effectively 
solve complex problems, particularly those freighted with issues of 
personal values and professional responsibility.  It then describes an 
alternative pedagogy, problem-based learning, that provides valuable 
insights to teaching law students to become ethical practitioners. 
I.  WHAT ARE LAW STUDENTS TAUGHT ABOUT RESPONDING TO 
ETHICAL PROBLEMS?  
A.  Examples from Lawyering: The Real World  
Case #1 
A bright, honest, and hard working fourth year associate, in whom 
all of the partners saw the potential for partnership, was investigating a 
discrimination charge brought by a former employee of the firm’s client.  
She decided that a fellow employee might have some important 
information.  After getting the client’s approval to interview him, she 
telephoned him to arrange a meeting to discuss the case.  The employee 
asked her whether the call was about some problem with his work.  She 
told him “no,” that everything was fine with him, but that as counsel to 
the company, she needed to talk to him about a matter relating to 
another person she was investigating, whom she then identified.  The 
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employee also said that since he still saw the former employee from 
time to time, he did not want the former employee to know he said 
anything negative about him.  The associate assured the employee that 
their conversation would be confidential.  The employee then agreed to 
meet the next day at the law firm’s office. 
In fact, the associate did not know whether the work of the 
employee to whom she was talking was fine, nor had she been 
authorized by the client to tell the employee that.  Moreover, while she 
was not a “blabber mouth,” she had every intention, in accordance with 
Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct,2 to report to her client 
what she learned from the interview. 
Case #2 
Associate to Partner: “I’ve met with the client in the XYZ matter, 
gone over the interrogatories and document requests we got from the 
other side, reviewed our client’s draft answers, and the documents they 
have found that respond to the requests.  I think I have a pretty good 
idea of what we can answer and what we can object to as being unduly 
burdensome or not likely to lead to relevant evidence.  Do you want me 
to draft a set of responses for you to review before they go out to the 
client, or to draft a memo to you explaining what I’ve found, and how I 
think we should respond?” 
Partner to Associate: “As I recall, these are their first discovery 
requests to us, so why don’t you object to all of their interrogatories and 
document requests? I am sure that you can find some basis to do so.  
When they come back to us to negotiate, which they have to do before 
they can file any motion to compel, we’ll be in a better position to see 
what they really want and to negotiate from there.” 
The associate left the partner’s office, presumably to do as he had 
been instructed. 
 
In Case #1, the well meaning associate may have violated Rules 
4.1(a)3 and 4.34 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  First, she 
 2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4  [hereinafter “MODEL RULES”] 
(stating that “[a] lawyer shall keep the client reasonable informed about the status of the 
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information” and “shall 
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation”). 
 3. See MODEL RULES  R. 4.1 (a). 
 4. See MODEL RULES R. 4.3. 
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told the employee that he had done nothing wrong, implying that she 
knew that to be a fact, when she did not.5  Then, she represented to the 
employee that what he told her would be “confidential” in a situation in 
which he reasonably would have thought that she would tell no one else, 
although the “confidentiality” of which the lawyer was speaking does 
not prohibit her from telling her client, the employer.6  Indeed, she may 
be bound to disclose what she learns to the employer even if it 
implicates this employee in wrongdoing.7  At the same time, she may 
have violated Rule 1.6,8 when she disclosed to the prospective 
interviewee that there was nothing wrong with his performance, a fact 
that she could have learned only from the client, and made the 
disclosure without the client’s permission. 
In Case #2, the partner may well be counseling the associate to 
violate Rule 3.19 by asserting an issue—objections to the discovery 
requests—without a “basis for doing so that is not frivolous.” This 
would be particularly likely where the partner has not reviewed the 
discovery requests, and thus had no basis to assume that all of them 
were legitimately subject to objection.  If the case is pending in the 
federal court or in the court of a state having a rule similar to Rule 11, or 
26(g)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,10 the partner may also 
be counseling the associate to violate those rules. 
 5. See MODEL RULES R. 4.1 (a) (stating that “in the course of representing a client 
a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a 
third person”). 
 6. The Model Rules state that:  
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a 
lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.  When the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands 
the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct 
the misunderstanding. 
See MODEL RULES R. 4.3. 
 7. See MODEL RULES R. 1.4 (holding that “(a) A lawyer shall keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter; (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to 
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions about 
the representation”). 
 8. MODEL RULES R. 1.6 (explaining that “A lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except 
for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation. . .”). 
 9. See MODEL RULES R. 3.1  (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or 
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not 
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or 
reversal in existing law.”) 
 10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 26(G)(2). 
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To me, the examples11 demonstrate two problems of professional 
responsibility: (1) an attorney who, in the daily pressure to zealously 
represent the client, simply does not bring to consciousness a significant 
question of professional responsibility; (2) an associate who is told by a 
more senior lawyer to do something that might well raise a significant 
question of professional responsibility, and fails to question the 
instruction, because he doesn’t recognize the problem, assumes there 
might be a problem but that the senior lawyer, being older, wiser, and 
more experienced, knows better, or considers the ethical problem, but, 
fears demonstrating disloyalty to the client and/or the senior lawyer. 
Case #3 
An attorney was representing a parent in a custody dispute 
involving their ten year old child.  The parents had been separated since 
the child was six years old.  The opposing party had “primary” custody 
and the client had “partial” custody (or “visitation”).  The client had 
begun the custody proceeding desiring to obtain primary custody, 
believing that he/she could be a better parent.  The child, however, was 
thriving in the current living arrangement, physically healthy, doing 
well in school both academically and socially, demonstrating 
appropriate behaviors at home, with the client during weekends and 
extended times there, at school, and with friends in the neighborhood.  
In addition, the child had recently begun singing in the church’s 
children’s choir and seemed to enjoy that activity very much. 
Shortly before the date of the hearing, the client arrived at the 
lawyer’s office to prepare.  The client informed the lawyer that he/she 
had some new information that should help considerably.  The client 
had recently learned that the custodial parent had been living with a 
partner of the same sex in a homosexual relationship.  The lawyer 
responded by asking how the client believed that relationship might 
affect the child.  The client responded that homosexuality was immoral, 
and that living in a household of such blatant immorality would 
permanently damage the child, and perhaps lead the child to adopt 
homosexuality as a way of life.  The lawyer sought, but got nothing 
more from the client in the way of evidence of harm to the child. 
 11. Both of these incidents arose at highly respected law firms. In the course of my 
exposure to litigation as a law clerk for a federal district court judge and as a lawyer for 
more than thirty-five years, I experienced, firsthand, and frequently heard of other, 
numerous incidents of these kinds of, at least arguable, ethical failings. 
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Under the law of the state in which the matter was pending, a 
parent’s sexual orientation is entirely irrelevant to custody unless there 
is evidence that it is causing some harm to the child.  The client’s fear 
that the child was in a sinful environment based upon the homosexual 
relationship of the other parent is a matter of religious difference 
between the parents and, absent some palpable harm to the child, that 
too, was irrelevant. 
At the same time, the lawyer knew that the judge before whom the 
matter was to be heard had a reputation as a homophobe.  The lawyer 
believed that if the situation was brought to the judge’s attention, he 
would likely decide the matter in his client’s favor, and that if there was 
an appeal, the judge would write an opinion explaining the decision on 
grounds totally unrelated to the evidence of the other parent’s 
homosexuality. 
Should the lawyer, in an opening statement, in questioning the 
opposing party, or in some other way, bring out the issue of the other 
parent’s living situation in order to influence the judge? I have asked 
that question on many occasions to law students and lawyers.  Almost to 
a person, the unhesitating response is that the lawyer, in the zealous 
representation of his client, should find a way to reveal the living 
arrangements even without any evidence of adverse affect on the child.  
If opposing counsel fails to object, or if he does object and the objection 
is overruled, that is not the questioner’s concern in our system.  As to 
what the judge decides, and how he explains his decision in an opinion, 
that is up to the judge, not the lawyer. 
“But what about Rule 3.1?”12 The answer, invariably, is that as an 
advocate for my client in our adversary system, I don’t have to make 
objections to my own questions, that is for my opponent; nor do I make 
the rulings on evidence, that is for the judge, and Rule 3.1 doesn’t 
require anything else.  Occasionally a lawyer or law student seeks to 
“fight the hypo” by arguing that if my client thinks that living in the 
other parent’s household is harmful to the child, perhaps it is, in some 
way we don’t yet understand.  Thus, the question is not improper.  
Rather than even concede that there is an ethical question, the law 
students and lawyers present arguments (the zealous advocate in the 
adversarial system) for their client’s desired position. 
The associates in both cases #1 and #2 graduated from excellent 
law schools, and had been on their respective schools’ Law Reviews.   
 12. See MODEL RULES R. 3.1. 
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Presumably both had passed the school’s course on legal ethics, as well 
as the MPRE.  The lawyer in case #3, a pre-1974 law school graduate, 
was experienced and well respected among his peers.  If you asked the 
first associate directly whether it is permissible to lie to a witness about 
some fact relevant to the witness, whether she was free to disclose 
information about the employee’s employment with a client without the 
client’s permission, or whether she was free not to tell the witness that 
her interest as counsel for the client and his interest might be adverse, I 
have no doubt that she would have quickly answered, “No” to all three 
questions.  If you asked the associate in Case #2 whether he had an 
obligation to respond to discovery requests in good faith, rather than 
simply delay and force the requesting party to negotiate without any 
good faith objection to particular interrogatories or document requests, I 
suspect that he would have answered in the affirmative.  Indeed, I am 
quite certain, knowing the partner in case #2, as I do, that if the partner 
was asked a similar question in a general form, not related to a specific 
matter in which he was involved, he, too, would have immediately 
answered “yes.”  If you had asked lawyer #3 if it is permissible to 
proffer evidence one knows to be inadmissible, I believe that he would 
have answered in the negative.  So, why had each of these lawyers acted 
as they did? 
Case # 413
There is a scene at the beginning of the movie, 
“PHILADELPHIA”14 in which Tom Hanks comes into Denzel 
Washington’s law office seeking representation to sue his former law 
firm for wrongful termination.  Hanks is a young lawyer who has 
recently been fired because, he believes, the firm’s management 
discovered that he had AIDS.  Washington, an apparently successful, 
contingent fee, plaintiffs’ lawyer, declines the representation because of 
Hanks’ illness.  What gives the scene particular bite is that Hanks was 
preceded into Washington’s office by a man who wanted representation 
to sue the city for negligence.  It seems that there was a hole in the 
middle of the street where the city was having some construction done, 
 13. While this example is from a movie, as opposed to the actual experience, the 
reality that many of us see every day is that civil legal services organizations seem 
forever to be narrowing the scope of cases they can take, and closing intake of new 
cases, while bar association pro bono organizations are always short of volunteers, even 
for cases that appear to have merit. 
 14. PHILADELPHIA (TriStar Pictures 1993). 
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the location was in mid-block, rather than in a pedestrian crosswalk, and 
the construction site was clearly marked off by yellow warning tape.  
Nevertheless, the prospective plaintiff managed to find and fall into the 
hole.  Even Washington seems surprised, after asking in vain for 
evidence of mitigating circumstances, to find that the man still wants to 
sue.  Despite these extraordinary facts, Washington readily agrees to 
represent the injured man, and even refers him for examination by a 
doctor that Washington apparently uses in such cases. 
B.  Learning Does Not Necessarily Lead to Doing. 
Learning the Rules of Professional Conduct does not necessarily 
lead to ethical practice. 
Moral life is not to be confused with tests meant to measure certain kinds of 
abstract (moral) thinking, or with tests that give people a chance to offer 
hypothetical responses to made-up scenarios.  We never quite know what will 
happen in this life; nor do we know how an event will connect with 
ourselves.15
The associate in Case #1 was assigned to obtain information for 
her client’s defense of a claim against it.  Her conduct was both logical 
and truthful, and her purpose innocuous.  While truthfulness and benign 
purpose are relevant, they are not sufficient to satisfy the Rules of 
Professional Responsibility.  She had probably studied Rules 1.6, 4.1, 
4.3, and 4.4 in her Professional Responsibility course and in preparation 
for the MPRE.16  However, in all likelihood, her study of those rules 
was explicit—the class knew in advance that the treatment of those rules 
was to be covered in the readings and class.  And more likely than not, 
the cases and hypos would have focused on sharing information that 
might be harmful or embarrassing to the client, sharing information 
which the client does not want shared (Rule 1.6),17 or speaking or 
withholding information in order to take advantage of the third party.  
 15. ROBERT COLES, MORAL LIFE OF CHILDREN, 29 (Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press 
1986). 
 16. She might also have had a course in employment law; however, unless she 
attended a school that had adopted Deborah Rhode’s “Pervasive Method” of teaching 
ethics, DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE 
METHOD (2d ed., 1995), or something similar, it is unlikely that concern for ethical 
questions which might arise in the course of investigation of an employment case would 
have been included in such a course. 
 17. See MODEL RULES R. 1.6. 
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(Rules 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4)18  Here, that was not the case.  Hence, whatever 
memory she retained about the application of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct from those classes would not necessarily connect with the cues 
from her experience in “real life.” 
The associate in Case #2 may have had a similar non-recognition 
experience to that of the associate in Case #1.  However, let us assume 
that he actually did consider whether the instruction from the partner 
was ethically appropriate.  At that point, he would have faced a 
dilemma.  Should he, a young and aspiring associate, question a more 
senior lawyer, especially where that lawyer’s directive seems more 
likely to serve the client’s goal of the successful outcome of the 
litigation—a goal which the associate is bound to pursue, under Rule 
1.2(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct?19 The associate has been 
taught both in law school, and since entering practice, that he is bound 
to pursue the client’s lawful goals.  Should he deviate from that precept 
in a matter which would require him to question the partner’s ethics? 
Answering that question could lead to sweaty palms, or worse. 
What does the associate’s brain do when faced with this problem? 
The associate needs, in Case #1, to secure the witness’s information in 
order to be successful in representing her client, and thus satisfying her 
boss.  In Case #2 the associate needs to avoid conflict with his boss.  As 
I will argue below, our motivation significantly affects our analysis of 
problems with which we are faced, even when those goals appear to 
conflict with the clear meaning of the data.20  Thus, in both cases, the 
associates’ needs powerfully affected their judgment as to what 
behavior was appropriate, despite what they might know about the 
constraints of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  When the conflict 
 18. See id. at R. 4.1, 4.3.  See also MODEL RULES R. 4.4 (providing that “In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantiated purpose 
other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third party, or use methods of obtaining 
evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.”). 
 19. MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a). 
 20. Ziva Kunda noted that: 
[M]otivation and affect influence judgment by influencing the cognitive processes 
we engage in to arrive at a judgment. Both motivation and affect may influence 
which concepts, beliefs, and rules we apply to a judgment; we may be especially 
likely to apply those that are congruent with our goals and moods. Motivation and 
affect may also influence our mode of processing information, determining 
whether we rely on quick and easy inferential shortcuts or rely on elaborate, 
systematic reasoning. 
See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION, MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 211 (Mass.  Inst. of 
Tech., 1999). 
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between our goals and other values is serious enough to produce severe 
stress, our brains might well “downshift” into survival mode—fight or 
flight. 21  In Case #2, fight is not readily available, since there is no one 
to fight with except the partner, and that doesn’t seem likely to make 
things better.  If he challenges the partner’s ethics, even if he is right, 
and almost certainly if he is wrong, his job, his income, his future as a 
lawyer may be in jeopardy. Flight, for the associate in this case, means 
denial that this is his problem.  That is, acceding to the assumed wisdom 
of the partner.  Alternatively, the associate might think that he might be 
right even if he is only a second year associate.  In that case the “flight” 
response is to return to the “tried and true,” that is, to some problem 
solving mechanism that he has used successfully in “the law” before.22
Inevitably, we look for solutions to problems we face by first 
scanning our memories for similar situations, and applying the 
principles and methods that we used in those situations.  In the case of 
lawyers, particularly newer lawyers, our memories for solving legal 
problems were created in law school.23
I suggest that the fundamental problem solving principles that our 
students are taught in law school are: 
1.  The answer lies in the formulation of a legal rule; 
2.  My role as a lawyer, i.e., a “zealous advocate,” is to help my 
client achieve his goal, regardless of what the law seems to be.  Lawyers 
help their clients achieve their goals principally by building arguments 
that will lead to the application of the desired legal rule to the client’s 
situation. 
3.  Neither my personal values, nor the interests of third parties are 
to be considered in the pursuit of my client’s goals.24
Applying those principles, the associate in case #2 might examine 
Rule 3.1, the apparently governing legal rule: “A lawyer shall 
not. . . .defend a proceeding, or. . . controvert an issue therein, unless 
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good 
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law.”25
Perhaps he would argue that Rule 3.1 does not apply because non-
responsiveness to discovery requests is not “defend[ing] a proceeding or 
 21. See discussion infra, p. 678. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See discussion infra, pp. 653-54. 
 25. MODEL RULES R. 3.1. 
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controvert[ing] an issue therein. . . .” thereby obviating the fear of 
violation of the Rules.  He can then go back to the individual discovery 
requests and re-examine them to see if he can so interpret them as to 
find a basis for asserting that “the information sought [does not] appear 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” 
under Rule 26 (b)(1)26 or come up with some other acceptable objection.  
Since, whether this process satisfied his personal values or unduly 
burdened the opposing party or its counsel is irrelevant under the “three 
principles,” his post-hoc rationale, carried out in accordance with his 
law school learning about how to be a lawyer, would provide him with a 
basis, morally justifiable to himself, for following the partner’s 
direction. 
Similarly, in Case #3, the lawyer may well resort to the above 
principles by first making an argument that the introduction of the 
inadmissible evidence does not raise an ethical issue based upon the 
argument that the admissibility of the evidence in question is not a 
“proceeding” or an “issue” in a proceeding, because the latter refers to a 
substantive issue.  Alternatively, it is simply not part of his “role” as a 
zealous advocate for his client to avoid proffering evidence merely 
because the other party might object and the judge might sustain the 
objection.  The attorney might also argue that he is, in good faith, 
arguing for “an extension, modification or reversal” of the otherwise 
applicable rule as to the admissibility of such evidence, or at least that 
he needs to preserve his ability to do so on appeal by raising the matter 
at the trial level.27
C.  What’s Wrong With this Picture? And Why? 
In each of the examples, the lawyer was faced with a situation 
which posed a complex problem with significant risks—problems that 
threatened to lead them away from “zealously,” and perhaps 
 26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (claiming that “Relevant information need not be 
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”). 
 27. The Federal Rules of Evidence explain the concept of offer of proof as: 
In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked.  Once the court makes a definite ruling on the record 
admitting or excluding evidence, wither at or before trial, a party need not renew 
an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. 
See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2) 
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successfully, pursuing their clients’ expressed goals.  In Case #1 the 
problem was how to get important information from an individual who 
was fearful that disclosure that might harm her.  In Case #2, the problem 
was responding to discovery without giving away information 
unnecessarily, and when a more senior lawyer has told you to respond in 
a manner that you think might be unethical.  In Case #3, the problem is 
how to win the case, and appear to be zealously representing your client, 
while not using evidence that, to the client is clearly both critically 
relevant and highly persuasive, but to the experienced lawyer is clearly 
inadmissible.  Lawyers face such situations frequently.  Indeed, it can be 
said that the most important work that lawyers do is to solve complex 
problems, whether of ethics, or otherwise.28 While law schools make 
some effort to teach students analytical tools for addressing those 
situations, the curriculum and pedagogy of most law schools effectively 
teaches them how to solve only a very narrow range of problems, using 
a very narrow range of their problem solving tools.29
Observing Denzel Washington’s choice not to represent Tom 
Hanks in PHILADELPHIA, one might argue (as many of my students 
have) that a lawyer in private practice is free to decline to represent 
anyone that he/she chooses.  Yet, we also know that our legal system 
assumes that competent representation is essential for anyone who seeks 
redress in our courts.  The Supreme Court has held that representation is 
 28. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, 
and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 315 (1995) (promoting the use of 
cognitive science to help understand how lawyers make decisions and arguing that in 
order to be more effective problem solvers, students need practice solving problems, a 
skill not emphasized in most law schools); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: 
ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY, 101 (Oceana Publications 1951) (arguing that lawyers, 
through “human ingenuity,” keep the law and the legal system, as well as the legal tools 
available to commercial enterprises, on pace with our constantly evolving society); Alan 
M. Lerner, Law & Lawyering in the Workplace: Building Better Lawyers by Teaching 
Students to Exercise Critical Judgment as Creative Problem Solvers, 32 AKRON L. REV. 
107, 109-112 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of lawyers exercising critical 
judgment in solving problems); Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: 
Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problems Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
5, 6 (1995) (criticizing law schools’ failure to adequately prepare students in skills 
beyond doctrine and legal analysis and proposing as an alternative courses which 
integrate “insights” from disciplines such as economics, psychology, and business); 
Thomas D. Barton, Conceiving the Lawyer as Creative Problem Solver: Introduction, 
34 CAL. W. L. REV. 267, 267-270 (1998) (stressing the importance of creative problem 
solving in law). 
 29. Blasi, supra note 28, at 319, 359-360, 386-387; see also, Steven I. Friedland, 
How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1996). 
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mandatory in serious criminal cases30 though not in civil cases.31 
However, the Model Rules encourage lawyers to engage in “pro bono 
publico service,” and cases such as Hanks’s fit precisely within the 
classes of cases identified in the rule.32  The fact that Hanks had been 
turned down by ten other lawyers, and that Washington was his last 
hope did not move Washington, even to make the superficial inquiry 
about the potential legal merits of the claim, as he had with the previous 
client with a facially questionable claim. 
The four examples thus demonstrate, as Robert Coles argued,33 that 
knowledge of the rules and legal analysis that we teach do not 
necessarily lead to ethical, professionally responsible action. 
And while law schools regularly give public kudos to lawyers who 
perform work in the public interest, in their classes, they provide no 
exposure to difficult questions concerning how students’ personal 
values should influence their professional choices of clients, or their 
professional behavior, what, if any, pro bono work to do, how to 
balance pro bono work with fee generating work, or how to deal with 
superiors in one’s law firm whose focus may be on billable hours and 
litigation outcomes, rather than on the aspirations of Rule 6.1, or some 
concept of ethical and professional practice.  Consequently, students 
emerge from law school either not steeped in the values of public 
service and the responsibility of lawyers to assure that individuals have 
access to legal services, or lacking the tools to navigate both the 
economic demands of the private practice of law, and the urgings of 
Rule 6.1, as they reflect genuine need within our communities.  And, 
when confronted with ethical problems, they make arguments to justify 
doing what will most likely lead to the result sought by the client, or the 
senior partner, regardless of the spirit of the rules, their own values, or 
the public interest. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that Dean Mark A. Sargent  
expressed such skepticism about lawyers being positively moved to 
behave more ethically even in the face of the mandates and potential 
penalties of the recently promulgated Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,34 
 30. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 31. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 
U.S. 18 (1981). 
 32. MODEL RULES R. 6.1(a) (1) and (b) (1) and (2) (ABA). 
 33. COLES, supra note 15, at 29. 
 34.  Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6295 (Feb. 6, 2003), codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205. 
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concluding, that “[t]he mere existence of the rules may have a deterrent 
effect on many cautious and conscientious lawyers, but if the kinds of 
firms that actively or passively contributed to the egregious behavior of 
corporate clients such as Enron, WorldCom and so many others are  
dominated by a moral consciousness that encourages endless 
rationalization and willful blindness, then the deterrent effect is likely to 
be minimal.”35
Thus, the legal academy should be asking whether the prevailing 
curriculum fails to support, or may actually impede students’ 
development as both effective, and professionally responsible, ethical 
lawyers, and whether we can do better.36
One reason for our persistence on our current path is, I believe, that 
we have not incorporated into our teaching scientific discoveries over 
the past two or three decades about how people learn, what inhibits and 
enhances their effective use of what we teach, and the effective use of 
learning to address emerging problems, particularly when those 
problems are professionally threatening to them. 
The legal literature contains a number of examples of experiments 
with teaching professional responsibility using experiential methods.37  
  35.  Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, 49 VILL. L.REV. 867, 884 
(2004). 
 36. In 1998, Professor Susan Sturm and I developed a first year elective course 
designed to teach problem solving to law students in the second semester of the first 
year, by creating a series of simulations in which they would be placed in role and asked 
to create a solution to the problem. Lerner, supra note 28, at 109-110 nn.2-3. In the first 
role play in which the students were assigned to represent one of four parties engaged in 
a dispute, we asked them to prepare a letter to their respective clients explaining the case 
and making a recommendation as to what the client should do. Although the problem 
did not say that litigation had been started, or even was contemplated, by any party, 
every student assumed that they were already in litigation in court, and addressed only 
the potential litigation strategies in their letters to their clients. Id. at 123-124. 
 37. See, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel, On Trying to Teach Judgment, 12 LEGAL EDUC. 
REV. 19 (2001) (sharing the author’s experience teaching professional responsibility to 
upper-year students through the use of real world dilemmas that evoke student responses 
on both an intellectual and emotional level, student participation, and occasional role 
plays); Eleanor W. Myers, Teaching Good and Teaching Well: Integrating Values with 
Theory and Practice, 47 J. LEGAL ED. 401 (1997) (relating the author’s experience 
teaching the two semester “Integrated Transactional Practice” course which includes 
trusts and estates, professional responsibility, interviewing, negotiating, counseling, and 
drafting); Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential 
Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 522-528, 532-535 (1995) (discussing the author’s 
experience of how teaching a professional responsibility course centered on student 
group interaction and collaboration to solve problems rather than teacher led discussions 
improved the students’ moral reasoning); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good 
Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995) 
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There are also articles which seek to explain why experiential pedagogy 
can be expected to produce more effective learning in this area than 
other methods.38  Conversely, I have, too often, heard from fellow law 
teachers that, starting with students who have spent the first 22 or more, 
formative years of their lives developing their character—for better or 
for worse—our three years of law school cannot possibly be expected to 
have any impact on the ethics and professional responsibility of the 
graduates that we send out into the profession and the world.39  Yet 
there is also evidence that professional school may be an ideal place to 
teach ethical decision making.40
With that in mind, I propose to (a) examine recent discoveries in 
cognitive science about how humans learn and what affects their ability 
to apply what they have learned to new situations, (b) assess how that 
data relates to how we educate our students, and (c) identify approaches 
to teaching that I submit will enable us to help our students become 
more ethical, professionally responsible lawyers.  Part II of this paper 
will discuss applicable scientific principles of learning and problem 
solving.  Part III will compare those principles with the strategy, 
(discussing the authors’ incorporation of a legal ethics course with a clinical one in 
which students met weekly specifically to discuss ethical issues arising in their clinical 
work); Barton, supra note 28; SYMPOSIUM, TEACHING ETHICS, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. (Summer/ Autumn 1995) (collecting more than twenty articles discussing 
experiments in teaching legal ethics at various law school which received grants fro that 
purpose from the Keck Foundation). 
 38. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 28, at 315, 320; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical 
Legal Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984) 
(hypothesizing that in the future, law schools will have realized that concentrating solely 
on teaching students doctrinal analysis and case interpretation is too narrow and ill-
prepares them; rather, schools should focus on teaching students how to learn law from 
the exercise of practicing); Stephen McG. Bundy, Teaching Legal Ethics: Improving the 
Required Ethics Course, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1995) (discussing Boalt Hall’s 
experiment with teaching the required professional responsibility course in the first year 
and the school’s ultimate decision to return it to the upper-year curriculum). 
 39. See Luban & Millemann’s discussion of “The Problem of Excessive 
Engagement,” supra note 37, at 83-86 (exploring how students often reexamined their 
positions and changed their viewpoints after participating in clinical work, but if their 
exposure was limited to classroom learning only, their views were unchanged); Susan P. 
Koniak & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the Signs, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 118, 120 (1995) (promoting the importance of pervasively teaching legal ethics 
and noting that the failure to do so risks sending the message that there is no problem 
with behaving unethically); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Symposium, The Legal Profession: 
The Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 239, 240 (1998) (discussing 
the failure of law schools to teach ethics). 
 40. See James R. Rest, Can Ethics Be Taught In Professional School? Easier Said 
Than Done, PSYCHOL. RES., Winter 1988 at 22. 
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process, and effect of traditional Langdellian / Socratic teaching.  In Part 
IV, I will attempt to demonstrate why experiential, highly 
contextualized, behaviorally oriented, problem based teaching is likely 
to be more effective than traditional pedagogy in producing lawyers 
who are ethical and professionally responsible. 
II.  THE HUMAN BRAIN IS A PROBLEM SOLVING MACHINE . 
To use a modern business metaphor, learning and solving problems 
are part of the “core business” of the human brain.  One cogent example 
is that of learning language.  Virtually every child is born with the 
capacity to learn language.  Without taking a single lesson, they learn to 
understand and communicate in the language, or languages, that are 
most prevalent in their environment.  Where spoken language is the 
norm, they learn by hearing, then orally communicating.  Where signing 
is the norm, they learn to understand and then to communicate in sign.41  
Only thereafter do they learn to communicate through reading and 
writing.  Clearly “the brain” comes equipped to solve the problem of 
communication, and it accomplishes that goal by learning from its 
environment. 
Another example is the use of logic.  While there are substantial 
variances among individuals in their ability to use logic, the human 
brain seems to find logic compelling, if not irresistible.  As Steven 
Pinker has observed: 
All languages have logical terms like not, and, same, 
equivalent, and opposite. Children use and, not, or, and if 
appropriately before they turn three, not only in English but in 
half a dozen other languages that have been studied.  Logical 
 41. For a more detailed discussion see MARC MARSCHARK, PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF DEAF CHILDREN 98, 107 (Oxford University Press 1993) reviewing 
the literature reporting research as to language acquisition among deaf children, and 
concluding that “[s]ign language clearly can serve as an effective mode of 
communication for young deaf children and reveals typical stages of normal acquisition 
under certain circumstances.” Id. at 98.  “[I]conic signs and arbitrary signs are learned 
with equal facility by children acquiring sign as a first language. [and] unlike early 
gestures, are not necessarily tied to physical similarities in the world but represent true 
linguistic symbols at a stage of development prior to spoken words.” Id. at 107.  
Marschark concludes, “The sequence of emerging semantic relations in deaf children’s 
language production parallels that observed in hearing children, at least when manual 
deaf children are evaluated using sign language.” Id. at 126. 
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inferences are ubiquitous in human thought, particularly when 
we understand language.42
A.  The Brain: A Symphony in Three Movements  
The most widely accepted theory of the brain’s evolutionary 
development of functional specialization, first proposed by Paul D. Mac 
Lean, former director of the Laboratory of the Brain and Behavior at the 
U.S. National Institutes of Health, is that we have developed, over time, 
three discrete, though interconnected, areas of the brain.43 These areas 
are frequently referred to as the “R complex” or “reptilian” brain, the 
limbic system, and the neocortex.44
The reptilian brain is the most primitive part of the brain. Located 
in the brain stem, it is primarily involved with physical survival and 
operation of the “system” which is the body.  It controls food processing 
(eating and eliminating), systems operation (heart, lungs, liver, etc.), 
reproduction, establishing and maintaining home territory 
(territoriality), various “group” behaviors, and execution of  the flight-
or-fight response.45  Overall, R-complex behaviors are “automatic, have 
a ritualistic quality and are highly resistant to change.”46
The limbic system is primarily involved with the emotional system, 
with evaluating, organizing, and directing incoming data for processing 
in the brain stem and the cortex, and with our awareness of ourselves, 
physically and emotionally.  It is the focus of the creation of memories 
developed in the context of active living.  Contextual memories are a 
composite of our inner and outer worlds—our history of emotional and 
perceptual experiences, and new information constantly arriving 
through our ongoing perceptions and experiences.47
The limbic system is also involved with certain of our primal 
activities such as sense of smell, sex, nourishment, and bonding between 
 42. STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 334 (Penguin Press 1997). 
 43. Paul D. Mac Lean, A Mind of Three Minds: Educating the Triune Brain, in 
EDUCATION AND THE BRAIN, 308-342 (Jeanne S. Chall & Allan F. Mirsky, eds., 1978) 
(discussing the three parts of the brain—the “triune” brain—and how although it has 
expanded in size, the brain has retained the basic features that reflect human’s 
descendency from reptiles, early mammals, and recent mammals). 
 44. Id., see also RENATE NUMMELA CAINE & GEOFFREY CAINE, MAKING 
CONNECTIONS: TEACHING AND THE HUMAN BRAIN, 58 (Pearson Learning 1994). 
 45. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 59-61. 
 46. Id. at 59. 
 47. Id. at 62. 
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individuals.48 It is capable of mediating our responses to external data 
through its ability to “read” and act upon our emotional responses, as 
well as overriding rational thought.  Because the limbic system is 
involved in all of these activities, emotion is involved with virtually 
everything that we experience or do.  For example, when incoming data 
indicates a problem, and the limbic system in concert with our 
rational/emotional brain structures, can discover no appropriate solution 
or problem solving process, anxiety, even fear, takes over, and the brain 
activates our fight-or-flight stress response.49 The limbic system is 
powerful.  “We tend to follow our emotions.”50
Finally, the neocortex, the outer portion of the brain, does most of 
the processing of sensory data, and makes language, logical and formal 
thinking, and planning for the future possible.  It is responsible for the 
creativity that we call science and art,51 and is largely responsible for 
planning, analysis, sequencing, learning from errors, certain inhibitions 
to inappropriate behaviors, and capacity for abstraction, including 
empathy.52  Logical/rational thinking is centered in the neocortex.53
All three parts of the brain are in constant interaction.  Although 
one segment may be predominantly “in charge” at a given moment, the 
others are not entirely out of the picture.  This is especially true of the 
limbic system because it is engaged in activities which are also part of 
the function of the other two.  For example, the limbic system’s receipt, 
and direction of incoming data, relates to the perception and analysis of 
external data by the neocortex, and is also essential as a trigger for the 
response mechanism of the “reptilian” brain. 
The challenge for legal educators is to help students learn so that, 
when faced with problems, whether intellectual, moral or both, they 
 48. ROBERT SYLWESTER, A CELEBRATION OF NEURONS: AN EDUCATOR’S GUIDE TO 
THE HUMAN BRAIN, 43-44 (Zephyr Press 1995). 
 49. Id. at 45. 
 50. Id. at 44. See also, Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A  
Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 814 (2001) 
(arguing that moral judgment “is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations”); 
Joshua D. Greene, et al.,  An MRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral 
Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105 (2001) (arguing that based on their experiments, the degree to 
which emotion is engaged in influencing moral judgment varies with the kind of moral 
dilemma presented). See discussion supra pp. 657-58; THOMAS LEWIS, ET AL., A 
GENERAL THEORY OF LOVE, 112-118 (Vintage Books 2001); see also discussion infra 
pp. 671, 676-77, of LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: 
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Temple University Press 1991). 
 51. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 63. 
 52. Id. at 67. 
 53. Id. 
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avoid resorting solely to the automatic, primitive, flight or fight 
response, but rather engage their neocortex with all of its power to 
process sensory data, draw broadly from memory, abstract, identify 
patterns, analyze rationally, and create new concepts, thus bringing to 
consciousness a broad range of potentially effective, ethical responses.  
In the following sections I will argue that the keys to the ability to learn 
so that learning is usable for effective problem solving and ethical 
lawyering are (a) the brain’s neural network system for recording 
implicit experience in memory and later recalling it, (b) the emotional 
power of the limbic system, and (c) their interaction. 
B.  Creating Memory: Connectivity and our Neural Network System  
1.  Encoding the Brain—The Process of Transforming Sensory 
Perception and Feeling into Memory 
In a very real sense, we are our memories because it is from our 
memories alone that we have a conception of who we are.  We can have 
that conception only as it relates to the environment in which we exist.54  
How our ongoing experience of the environment is recorded, stored, and 
recalled is what memory is all about.  The stimulation of our sense 
organs and our emotions causes electrical impulses to be transmitted to 
nerves which connect the sense receptors to the brain, where they are 
encoded.  Memory is the result of the process by which the electrical 
impulses caused by sense and emotional stimulation are recorded in the 
brain.55  The physiological key to those processes are the neurons and 
their interactions with each other throughout the brain.  “[T]he content 
of brain activity lies in the patterns of connections and activity among 
the neurons.”56  Because we are always in some context and the brain is 
always receiving sensory signals and recording them, the brain is always 
learning and changing.57
Our neural networks build on existing patterns.58  When new data 
comes into memory, it seeks connections with similar content 
 54. DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND 
THE PAST, 40-42 (Basic Books 1996). 
 55. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 103; SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 98-100; 
CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 30-31; PINKER, supra note 42, at 25-26. 
 56. PINKER, supra note 42, at 25. 
 57. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 31. 
 58. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 128-29; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 61. 
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previously recorded.59 The more we repeat experiences that create the 
same or similar patterns of neural connection, the stronger the pattern 
becomes, and the more likely we are to trigger its recall later.60
This system of creating memory through the patterns of 
connections among neurons, and the tendency of repetition to strengthen 
the pattern and its likely recall, gives rise to several powerful tools, 
including the ability to correct errors in the perceived data, to 
conceptualize, and to create meaning from discordant data. 
a.  Error Correction 
When I send an email to my wife at Temple Law School and 
inadvertently omit the “u” from the last segment of her address, the 
email invariably returns as undeliverable.  If the process were run 
through my brain, however, it would recognize that I was aiming for 
“temple.edu”—not “temple.ed”—and make the correction.61
b.  Conceptualization 
As the brain records similar patterns over time, the common 
elements of those patterns are strengthened, while the uncommon 
elements become weaker, and less likely to be recalled.  The result is the 
extraction, or creation, of a pattern that represents the core set of 
connections, the prototype or underlying concept common to the various 
inputs.62
c.  Creating Meaning from Apparently Discordant Data 
Frequently, there may be two possible interpretations from the 
same sense data.  In such cases the brain is capable of comparing the 
 59. PINKER, supra note 42, at 108-10 (pointing out that we learn from examples 
where learning consists of  increasing the “weight” of the connections between and 
among the memories of  related inputs, what he calls a “pattern associator.”). 
 60. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 132-38. Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 162-64 
(“We often approach people and events with prior expectencies. . . .Your expectencies 
may determine the very meaning you ascribe to . . . behaviors as you observe them. 
Events that are congruent with our expectations may be particularly memorable not only 
because we pay greater attention to them, but also because they are more strongly 
related to our existing beliefs.” ). 
 61. See id. at 136-38 for a more detailed discussion of how the brain performs this 
operation. 
 62. Id. at 111, 128-32, 135, 136-38; PINKER, supra note 42, at 108-10. 
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input data to context and searching among similar patterns of neural 
connections in order to select the best “fit.”  Steven Pinker gives the 
example of hearing someone say what sounds like “I am going to sinned 
a pin.”63  The brain could take those sounds and seek their meaning 
from memory exactly as they were heard.  However, in the process of 
trying to locate a pattern that matched the sound and meaning it would 
likely find no match.  Rather than merely reporting back “does not 
compute,” as it might if the words heard were in a language that the 
listener knew she didn’t understand, the brain will try to figure out what 
does make sense by finding a pattern of neural connections that best 
satisfies all of the ambiguities at once.  If the listener’s memory has 
recorded that the speaker is one who speaks with a decided southern or 
southwestern accent and what that means her brain will determine 
whether that pattern fits both the sound and contextually meaningful 
interpretation.  Even, however, if the listener does not know the 
speaker’s dialect, she knows that a single speaker uttered both of the 
“in” vowel sounds.  Her memory tells her that at a given time a single 
speaker usually attaches the same vowel sound to the same vowel.  Thus 
it is more likely than not that both of the sounds represent the same 
letter.  Her brain will then try out the available vowels, a, e, o, and u, 
and discover that the only vowel that satisfies the constraints of being 
similarly sounded and making sense in the context is “e.” At that point, 
the listener’s memory will record that the speaker said, “I am going to 
send a pen.”64
In Pinker’s example, the critical work of the brain was finding 
patterns in the memory that most closely matched the pattern coming 
from the sensory perceptions, knowledge of the speaker, and the 
meaning created by the context of what was said.  That required the 
brain to remember not only the specifics, such as how different vowels 
sound, but also to store myriad facts about the way the world operates, 
such as that most people give the same vowel the same sound, native 
speaking people from the southeastern and southwestern states 
frequently speak with a particular dialect, and that the “e” and “i” 
sounds are frequently the same in that dialect.  All of this data is in our 
memory even though we never consciously studied it, and the process 
operates far below our level of conscious awareness. 
And it all happened below our consciousness, and so quickly that 
we are not aware of the process. 
 63. PINKER, supra note 42, at 105. 
 64. Id. at 106. 
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In solving the problem of discordant data, the brain will, as we 
have seen, be substantially influenced by our expectations and needs.65
2.  Explicit and Implicit Memory 
a.  Explicit Memory 
Certain memories, referred to as “explicit,” or “taxon,” memory, 
result from intentional learning.  Because the material was explicitly 
studied as a unique focus of creating a memory of itself, rather than as 
part of a broader experiential context, its memory involves only a few of 
one’s senses and exists with minimal connection to other memories.66  
Learning the directions from point “A” to point “B” written out for you 
by a friend, or learning how to take apart and re-assemble your rifle, is 
done explicitly.  Acquiring such memories usually requires repetition, 
and may also be assisted by observation of experts and continual 
feedback.  Such memories include automatic skill sequences.   
Memorization of the multiplication tables, the steps to turn on my 
computer or car, touch typing, taking apart and re-assembling one’s rifle 
in the dark, and specific athletic skills are types of taxon memory.  
Memory acquired by explicit learning moves easily between memory 
and conscious activation.  Taxon memories are thus valuable in survival 
situations because when triggered by the suggestion of danger, the skills 
and memories laid down in that system of memory can quickly be called 
into play, and we can expect the learned standard response even without 
conscious prompting.67
b.  Implicit Memory 
In contrast, memory that develops from our participation in our 
environment and comes to us through a wider variety of sensory 
receptors is referred to as “implicit,” “locale,” or “map” memory.68  It is 
referred to as “locale” or “map,” because it embeds into memory not 
 65. See ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 162-64 (demonstrating how our emotional 
states of needs/desire/motivation, and expectation affect the memory we create from the 
data we perceive); see also, discussion infra, pp. 669-78. 
 66. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 42-44; see SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 170 
for a demonstration of this with amnesic patients. 
 67. SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 95-96. 
 68. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 44-47. 
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only the specific data to be “learned,” but also the context, or locale, in 
which we experienced it.  It is “implicit” because it arises out of our 
participation in our environment, without regard to our conscious 
intention to remember it, and relates to ongoing aspects of our lives.69 
Since our engagement with our environment is continuous, it is related 
to, and builds upon, knowledge that already exists in memory.70  
Implicit memory develops from the ongoing effort of the brain to create 
patterns and relationships and to create meaning.71  It does not require 
repetition or memorization. 
The neural network system for creating memory is constantly 
recording the context in which we move and experience life.  Learning 
that takes place implicitly is recorded as part of the entire contextual 
pattern, and thus has multiple sensory inputs and myriad neural 
connections.  Each new pattern of connections contributes to the brain’s 
memory of the event.72 Therefore, the more perceptual and emotional 
inputs that create the neural pattern for a memory, the more connections 
are created among the neurons.  The more points of connection in a 
pattern of memory, the more likely that a particular stimulus will bring 
it to recall. 73
3.   Social Intuitions 
Just as all of us are born with the neural tools to learn language 
implicitly, we are also born with the neural tools to develop values. 
During our lives we are immersed in the “beliefs, values, sanctions, 
rules, motives and satisfactions” of our particular communities.74  When 
we are hungry or uncomfortable as infants, at home, at school and play, 
the family mealtime, observing our parents interactions with each other, 
 69. Id. at 46; SYLWESTER, supra note 48 at 95-98; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 42-
45. 
 70. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 46; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 44-46. 
 71. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 46. 
 72. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 58-59. 
 73. Id. at 42-46, 71; see also CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 48-49. 
74.  HAIDT—THE EMOTIONAL DOG, supra note 50, at 847 (arguing that moral 
judgment “is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations”), quoting J. W. M. 
WHITING & IRVIN L. CHILD, CHILD TRAINING AND PERSONALITY: A CROSS CULTURAL 
STUDY 27 (1953).  See also John Dewey, Experience & Education, The Kappa Delta Pi 
Lecture Series, 48 (1938, Touchstone ed. 1997) (“Perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical 
fallacies is the notion that a person learns only the particular he is studying at the time. 
Collateral learning in the way of formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, 
may be and often is much more important than the spelling, or geography or history 
lesson that is learned. For these attitudes are fundamentally what count in the future.” 
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and with third parties, indeed on a continuing and ongoing basis from 
birth on, we learn about relationships and values.  Even without explicit 
lessons in morals and customs, we pay close attention to what we 
perceive them to be in our families, peer groups, etc., learning them 
implicitly, because failure to abide by them will have serious adverse 
consequences to us. Peer socialization contributes heavily to the shaping 
of these moral intuitions.75 There is strong evidence that the brain’s 
“hard wiring” for these moral values, develops during late childhood 
through adolescence.76  We learn these values without ever having 
explicitly studied them, and without consciousness of having learned 
them.77   Among the earliest lessons that we learn relate to seeking 
approval from, and obeying, those in positions of authority, those who 
hold the key to our survival, comfort, and success or failure, and notions 
of right and wrong. There are a variety of theories about exactly how 
these lessons are learned, the relationship between cognitive and 
emotional responses to environmental stimuli in forming the child’s 
values in these areas, and their evolution through childhood.78 Yet no 
75.   Id. at 828. 
76.  Id. at 827-28. 
77.   Haidt’s basic analysis is not new. For example, Lawrence Kohlberg  (Stages 
and Sequence, The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, 347, 365-68, in 
D.A. Goslin, ed., HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY and RESEARCH 
(Chicago, Rand McNally 1969)), and Carol Gilligan (IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: 
Psychological Theory of Women’s Development, Ch. 2, at 24-63 (Harvard University 
press, 1982)), while disagreeing about the nature and extent of the development of 
values and moral reasoning nevertheless agree that the process begins in childhood with 
implicit learning from the people closest to us. And Robert Coles demonstrates 
conclusively that moral development is certainly an active process in children from a 
very young age. Thus, we arrive at adulthood with implicitly learned, socially 
constructed “intuitions” concerning most aspects of moral values which form the basis 
of our adult moral reasoning—the “Social Intuitionist” model of moral reasoning. Even 
those who take issue with the power of Haidt’s social intuitionist model of moral 
decision making in adulthood, and the ability of learned cognitive behavior to overcome 
our social intuitions, agree that the process of developing the powerful, deeply imbedded 
values which form the foundation for our moral reasoning as adults proceeds through 
implicit childhood and adolescent learning.  See, e.g., D.A. Pizarro and P. Bloom, The 
Intelligence of the Moral Intuitions: A Reply to Haidt, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (2003). 
Haidt, however, counters by arguing that while the cognitive processes identified by 
Pizarro and Bloom can be deployed, they very seldom are; leaving our social intuitions 
to control our moral decision making. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog Does Learn 
New Tricks: A Reply to Pizarro and Bloom, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 197 (2003) (Hereinafter 
Haidt – New Tricks.). 
78   See, e.g., Marta Lupa, Elliot Turiel, and Philip A. Cowan, Obedience to 
Authority in Children and Adults, in Melanie Killen and Daniel Hart, eds., MORALITY IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE, Developmental Perspectives 131 (Cambridge University Press 
(1999)(reviewing various theories in developmental psychology, concluding that at least 
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authority suggests that early childhood learning is not relevant to the 
values and moral behavior of the adult. 
4.  Some Limitations of Implicit Memory 
At the same time, however, implicit memory has its limitations.  For 
example, the automatic error correction makes it very difficult for us to 
proof read our own writing, because our brains have, over time, 
developed strong patterns for perceiving and understanding the correct 
spellings, and, upon seeing a slightly incorrect one are likely to recall 
what we are actually seeing as the correct version.79  We bring to every 
problem a host of intuitions, beliefs, and assumptions.  These are 
concepts that we have built on implicit memory accumulated over the 
years, and we seldom, if ever, reconsider them without some strong 
external impetus.  When the patterns of memory we draw on to create 
meaning from discordant data are implicit memory we are not conscious 
of the analytical work that our brains are doing.  Our tendency to 
establish meanings, to draw conclusions, i.e., to conceptualize, from 
implicit memory, and thereafter to make judgments based on those 
concepts leads us to act without the application of critical judgment.80
 “Implicit memory warps our window on the world.”81  “While 
explicit memory serves itself up for conscious reflection, implicit 
memory does not.  That is why it escapes our notice.”82  “[We] acquire 
wonderfully complicated knowledge that we cannot describe, explain, 
or recognize.”83  “The brain never permits naked reality to intrude into 
consciousness; all inbound sensory impressions pass through a process 
that sands the rough edges off an inhospitably complex universe.”84  
“All experience comes to us through similar layers of invisible and 
occasionally dubious deductions.  Our internal realities are mock-ups of 
unparalleled persuasive power.”85  “Behind the bright, analytic engine 
three factors affect children’s likelihood of obeying authority despite the authority’s 
direction to act contrary to the child’s personal moral standard: (1) the proximity of the 
actor to the experience of harm to the victim (both physical proximity and likelihood of 
harm), (2) the legitimacy of the authority in terms of social context and knowledge, 
(3)the authority’s  ability to inflict punishment on the actor.) 
  79. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 138-39. 
 80. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 170-71. 
 81. LEWIS ET. AL., supra note 50, at 118. 
 82. Id. at 107. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 118-119. 
 85. LEWIS ET. AL., supra note 50, at 119. 
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of consciousness is a shadow of silent strength, spinning dazzlingly 
complicated life into automatic actions, convictions without intellect, 
and hunches whose reasons follow later or not at all.”86  Implicit 
memory has been shown, for example, to contribute to gender and racial 
biases that people are unaware that they possess.87
5. Emotion: The Foundation on which we Build Memory  
 We don’t see things as they are.  We see things as we are.88
a. “[E]motionally important contexts can create powerful memories.” 89  
The brain registers events as pleasurable or painful, exciting or 
soothing.90   The story and context relating to our experience necessarily 
involve emotion. While some particular emotional “highs” or “lows” are 
explicitly recorded in memory, most emotional learning is implicit.91  
All of our experiences involve our emotions. Thus our emotions are a 
critical part of the neural patterns that comprise the memory of any 
event. Indeed, some researchers have argued that there can be no 
memory without emotional content.92  
 86. Id. at 112. See also, Haidt, supra note 50; ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 50. 
 87. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 189-90. Geoffrey Hazard’s concern that the 
failure to teach ethics throughout the law school curriculum sends the implicit message 
lack of focus on ethical practice and professional responsibility is not a problem, 
HAZARD, supra note 37, and Howard Lesnick’s concern that the selection of subject 
matter in law school courses teaches a powerful implicit lesson that the matters not 
included are unimportant.  Howard Lesnick, Infinity In A Grain Of Sand: The World Of 
Lawyering As Portrayed In The Clinical Teaching Implicit In Law School, 37 UCLA L. 
REV. 1157 (1990), are but two examples of concern voiced by leading legal academics 
for the powerful and potentially pernicious effect of implicit learning. 
88.  I have often seen this quote attributed to Anais Nin, and on occasion to the 
Talmud, but never with any specific textual location. 
89.  Sylwester, supra, note 48; at 96; see also Schacter, supra note 54, at 201, 209 
(noting the power of memories concerning personal trauma); Caine and Caine, supra 
note 44, at 45-47 (discussing how emotions influence map formation in the brain)...
90.  Pinker, supra note 42, at 139.
  91.  LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 116.
92.  CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 63-64; See also C. Holden, Paul Mac Lean 
and the Triune Brain, 204 SCI. 1066, 1069 (observing that “[a]ccording to Mac Lean, 
subjectively ‘something doesn’t exist unless it’s tied up with emotion’.”). 
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Emotion drives attention,93 and to the extent that attention to the 
experience is an aid in creating memory, emotion is a major 
contributing factor. That which is meaningful to the rememberer will be 
more readily remembered than what is not.94  Our state of mind at the 
time that we experience events affects what we remember. 
Expectations95 and motivation96 are particularly important factors in 
determining what we store in memory.  
b.   Believing is Seeing97: Expectations and Motivation Guide Our 
Perceptions and Memory 
I used to teach my clinic and trial advocacy students that “fact” 
witnesses can only testify about what they actually see, hear, smell, 
taste, touch, and otherwise perceive with their senses. Now I teach them 
that fact witnesses can testify only about what they “think their senses 
perceive.” Our emotions affect not only what events we remember, but 
also how we remember what our senses have experienced. 
Expectations98 and motivation99 are particularly important factors in 
determining what we store in memory.  
93.  SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 72. At the same time, however, as discussed 
below at pp. 674-75, 78-79, powerful, negative emotion may cause the brain to narrow 
its focus and thus not give attention to relevant stimuli in the environment. 
94.  SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 44-45. But see, discussion of “downshifting,” pp. 
678-79, infra. 
95.  See ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 162 (“Your expectations may determine 
the very meaning you ascribe to [events as] you observe them, especially if they are 
ambiguous and can be understood in more than one way.... Even when events have clear 
meaning and are not open to multiple construals, our expectations can still influence our 
meaning by directing the amount of attention we devote to different aspects of reality as 
we observe it, and by determining how new information is linked to existing 
knowledge). 
96.  Id. at 168-70 (Motivation affects the nature and amount of attention we pay to 
what we perceive.  The way we process an event and its resulting memorability are also 
affected by the personal significance the event carries for us). 
97.  Thanks to Ian Weinstein, who introduced me to that felicitous phrase. 
98.  See ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 162 (“Your expectations may determine 
the very meaning you ascribe to [events as] you observe them, especially if they are 
ambiguous and can be understood in more than one way.... Even when events have clear 
meaning and are not open to multiple construals, our expectations can still influence our 
meaning by directing the amount of attention we devote to different aspects of reality as 
we observe it, and by determining how new information is linked to existing 
knowledge”). 
99.   Id. at 168-70 (Motivation affects the nature and amount of attention we pay to 
what we perceive. “The way we process an event and its resulting memorability are also 
affected by the personal significance the event carries for us”). 
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c.  Expectations, Perceptions, and Memory.  
Expectations can arise from many sources, such as prior 
experiences, information given by another person, stereotypes, etc.  One 
example of the power of expectations in creating memory is found in a 
study in which two groups of individuals were shown a video of a 
husband and wife interacting together. The difference between the two 
groups was that one group was told that the woman was a librarian, 
while the other was told that she was a waitress. Some of the activities 
and attributes of the woman were consistent with stereotypes of 
waitresses (e.g., drinks beer, affectionate with husband), and some with 
those of librarians. (E.g., wears glasses, listens to classical music) When 
the observers were questioned after viewing the video, they recalled the 
attributes consistent with the stereotype of the person that they expected 
to see, while not recalling the attributes that were more similar to the 
other.100  
d.  Motivation, Perceptions, and Memory. 
An example of a study that demonstrates the power of motivation 
in affecting our perceptions involved second year students at a religious 
seminary who were told that they had to give a practice sermon on the 
topic of The Good Samaritan. Immediately before the time scheduled 
for their assignment they were required to be across the campus from 
the location at which they were to deliver their sermon. Some of the 
students were told that they had plenty of time to get across the campus 
and still be on time, while others were told that they were running late, 
and needed to hurry in order to get to their assigned location on time. 
Along the way, each passed by a person slumped in a doorway, looking 
disheveled. Overwhelmingly, those that thought that they had plenty of 
time, stopped to see if they could help the person, while those who 
thought that they were late, did not. Later, when questioned about what 
they had seen, those that felt that they had adequate time, described the 
person as appearing to be in distress; while those that thought that they 
were running late, and did not stop, described the person in terms of 
appearing to be drunk, or on drugs.101
100.  See ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 164. 
101.  John Darley and Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of 
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY AND 
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 100 (1973). 
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C.  Responding Responsibly as Lawyers: Using the Tools Stored in 
Memory to Make Behavioral Choices. 
The myriad patterns of neural connections that make up our 
memory, and to which we are constantly adding, thankfully remain 
dormant until some stimulus or cue calls them to our consciousness.  
Our challenge is to make the greatest use of our explicit and implicit 
memories and the creative power of our neo-cortex, to solve the difficult 
problems that challenge us to act in an ethically and professionally 
responsible way, while effectively serving our clients. 
1.  The Power of Emotion in Problem Solving 
In The Person and the Situation,102 Lee Ross and Richard E. 
Nisbett collected the results of more than a dozen studies extending over 
more than twenty years by a wide array of researchers, to demonstrate 
that individuals make critical moral and personal decisions based on 
their emotional reaction to factors that appear to be inherent in the 
situation facing them, rather than on the individual’s previously 
demonstrated moral and analytical qualities.103  The vast disparity 
between actual and expected behavior strongly suggests that factors 
other than expressed moral values and analytical ability are driving the 
individuals’ decisions. 
a.  The Power of Implicit Emotional Memory; Herein of Social 
Intuitions and “Hot Cognition.” 
Recent work, by researchers at Princeton University and the 
University of Pittsburgh104 and by Jonathan Haidt at the University of 
Virginia,105 supports the proposition that emotions may be even more 
powerful than reasoning in making moral decisions.  In addition, 
psychiatrists Lewis, Amini, and Lannon, have drawn a similar 
conclusion from their own clinical experiences and a review of much of 
the research in the area.106 Cognitive psychologists refer to this process 
 102. ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 50. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Greene, et al., supra note 50. 
 105. Haidt, supra note 50. 
 106. See LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 106-20 (demonstrating how patients with 
implicit memory brain damage can still learn, but lose incremental acquisition of 
intuitive knowledge). 
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as “hot cognition,” which is the exercise of judgment that appears to be 
the result of our cognitive, analytical, processes, but is, in fact, driven by 
our emotions.107  Moreover, there is now a broad consensus that the 
impact of past experiences, even those of which we are not conscious, 
or were never conscious, can have great power in directing our present 
perceptions, judgments, feelings, and behaviors.108 “We may 
automatically infer people’s character from their behavior, 
automatically experience affective reactions to a variety of objects, 
automatically behave in line with traits cued by recent experiences, and 
automatically engage in a variety of other mental processes as well.”109  
Importantly, we are unaware of the operation of this process. 
Researchers at Princeton University and the University of 
Pittsburgh performed functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
studies on subjects given three different problems to solve: one with no 
moral dilemmas and two with the moral dilemma of whether it is 
morally acceptable to affect the death of one person in order to save 
five.110  The foundation for the latter two were what are known as the 
“trolley dilemma”: a trolley is proceeding out of control down a track 
towards five people who will certainly be killed if the trolley is not 
stopped or derailed, but to stop or derail the trolley will necessarily 
cause the death of one person.111
In the first of the two trolley situations, the subject is asked if he 
would throw the switch to shift the trolley to another track which would 
necessarily lead to the killing of one person who is standing on that 
track.  In the second situation, referred to as the “footbridge dilemma,” 
there is no switch; however, there is a very large man standing at the 
edge of the footbridge, under which the runaway trolley will pass before 
striking and killing the five victims.  If the subject pushes the man off 
the bridge into the path of the oncoming trolley, the man will be killed, 
but the impact will derail the trolley, saving the lives of the five persons 
who would have otherwise been killed.  The subject is asked whether he 
would push the man. 
 107. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 211 (“Both motivation and affect may 
influence which concepts, beliefs, and rules we apply to judgment; we may be especially 
likely to apply those that are congruent with our goals and moods. Motivation may also 
influence our mode of processing information, determining whether we rely on quick 
and easy inferential shortcuts, or rely on elaborate systematic reasoning.”). 
 108. Id. at 265-88. 
 109. Id. at 303. 
 110. Greene et al., supra note 50, at 2105. 
 111. See id. 
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Overwhelmingly, subjects said that they would throw the switch in 
the first case, but not push the man in the second.112  When asked to 
explain why, they were not able to do so based on any logical 
reasoning.113  Rather, it “felt” or “seemed” different.  During the 
experiment, the fMRI recorded very different brain activity in the two 
trolley situations.  The brain activity during “the switch” was much 
closer to that when the subject was considering the non-moral problem 
than it was to the brain acting on the “footbridge” version.  The 
difference was seen as the actor’s emotional connection with the act of 
actually pushing another to his death, as compared with the more 
impersonal, and thus less emotional, act of causing his death through the 
use of an intervening force, the trolley switch.114 Clearly, these 
responses demonstrate the “automatic processes” described by 
Kunda.115
“Intuitions within culturally supported ethics become sharper and 
more chronically accessible, whereas intuitions within unsupported 
ethics become weaker and less accessible.”116  Haidt does not deny that 
moral thinking and reasoning, and reflective judgment, can be taught, 
nor that once taught, they have no impact on one’s moral judgments and 
action.  Rather, he points to earlier demonstrations that “attempts to 
directly teach thinking and reasoning in a classroom setting generally 
show little transfer to activities outside the classroom, and because 
moral judgment involves [more highly emotionally charged] topics than 
are usually dealt with in courses that attempt to teach thinking and 
reasoning, the degree of transfer is likely to be even smaller.”117 Haidt’s 
argument is supported by subsequent work done by Joshua Greene and 
Haidt which concluded, “Neuroimaging studies of moral judgment in 
normal adults, as well as studies of individuals exhibiting aberrant 
behavior, all point to the conclusion, embraced by the social intuitionist 
model, that emotion is a significant driving force in moral judgment.   
These results also suggest that much, although not necessarily all, moral 
judgment makes use of processes [in the brain] specifically dedicated to 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 2106. 
 114. Greene et al., supra note 50, at 2105-08.  
 115. See supra note 107, and accompanying text. 
 116. Haidt, supra note 50, at 827. 
 117. Id. at 829. 
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social cognition and, more specifically, the representation of others’ 
mental states.”118  
b.  Cognitive Dissonance 
All of us like to feel good about ourselves and the institutions with 
which we identify. Thus, it is natural that we perceive our behaviors as 
being consistent with our values.119 Under certain conditions, 
discrepancies between what actions we take and our attitudes toward 
those actions can induce a state of tension. According to Leon Festinger, 
our inclination to reduce this tension, or cognitive dissonance, can 
sometimes cause us to act irrationally.120 We are well-versed in 
dissonance behavior; anytime we make a tough decision we tend to 
rationalize it by underscoring the pros of our decision and overstating 
the cons of the action we chose not to take.121
In a 1959 study by Festinger and J. Merrill Carlsmith, subjects 
were made to perform an extremely mundane task, as part of an 
“experiment.” Subjects were then offered compensation, either $1 or 
$20, to tell the next participant (who was actually a confederate) that the 
task was enjoyable. Afterward the participants were asked how they felt 
about the tasks. Those who did not deceive the confederate judged the 
tasks as boring, as did those who received $20 for the deception. 
However, those paid only a dollar to mislead the next participant ranked 
the tasks as somewhat enjoyable. While members of the $20 group were 
sufficiently justified in their actions, those in the $1 (a very small 
reward) group were not, and so changed their attitude to reduce 
dissonance. 122
In a similar study, children were threatened with either a mild or 
severe punishment to keep from playing with an appealing toy. While 
all subjects desisted, those threatened severely did not change their 
attitude toward the toy, while those threatened only mildly proceeded to 
 118. JOSHUA GREENE AND JONATHAN HAIDT, HOW (AND WHERE) DOES MORAL 
JUDGMENT WORK?, TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE, 2002 at 517, 522. 
119. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 218-23 (reviewing the consistent research that 
supports the conclusion that motivation to believe that one is a good person drives 
changes in behavior and attitude about one’s behavior). 
120.  See Leon Festinger, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, (Stanford 
University Press, 1957); Sharon S. Brehm, Steven Fein, and Saul M. Kassin, SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 206 (5th ed., Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002). 
121.  Brehm, et al, supra note 120, at 209. 
    122.  Id. at 206-08. 
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disregard the toy later. In fact, the milder the threat, the more one’s 
attitude tended to change.123  
 Claude Steele and his colleagues studied the possibility that the 
characteristic attitude changes associated with cognitive dissonance 
stem from a motivation to obtain self-affirmation following the 
challenge to one’s self-image when one engages in counter-attitudinal 
behavior.124  If the behavior is seen in a more favorable light, the person 
can reaffirm their sense of self as a respectable and intelligent person, 
hence the attitude change. One study involved participants who either 
did or did not care about politics and economics. Though all of the 
students were opposed to increases in tuition, they were asked to 
support considerable tuition hikes in an essay. Before they were asked 
about their attitudes, however, the students were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire about politics and economics. For those who appreciated 
politics and economics, the questionnaire provided self-affirmation by 
reminding them of an esteemed aspect of themselves, eliminating a need 
for attitude change. On the other hand, for participants not interested in 
politics and economics the questionnaire provided no self-affirmation, 
and these participants did, indeed, exhibit a corresponding change in 
attitude.  
Utilization of other means of self-affirmation during situations in 
which we must engage in counter-attitudinal behavior, helps us to 
maintain a consistent, rational, and positive view of our actions. 
Attributing our actions to the need to be a “zealous advocate” for our 
client, the supposed wisdom and experience of a superior, or simply the 
belief that “It’s not my decision to make,” might present such 
opportunities. 
123.   Id. at 208. 
124.  C.M. Steele and T.J. Liu, Dissonance Processes as Self Affirmation, 45 
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 5 (1983); Kunda, supra, note 20, at 220-23. 
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c.  Situationism125
 Among the studies on which Ross and Nisbett126 reported was 
Stanley Milgram’s renowned series of experiments, in which he 
demonstrated that given the right set of circumstances, otherwise good 
people can be influenced to “perform actions that were callous and 
severe.”127 Subjects of his experiment agreed to take part in a study 
measuring learning techniques, and met the professor in charge of the 
study, as well as a fellow participant (who, in reality, was a confederate 
of the investigator). The two participants were “randomly” assigned 
roles, the real subject assigned to play the “teacher,” and the confederate 
assigned to play the “learner.” The professor would read one word from 
an associated word pair, and if the learner did not provide the correct 
word association, the teacher would have to give him a slight electric 
shock by flipping a switch. However, with every wrong answer, the 
intensity of the shock would increase by 15 volts; silence would be 
treated as a wrong answer. There was no real electric shock; however, 
the “learner” had been prepared to simulate receipt of a shock of the 
degree that the “teacher” was told he was administering, including 
screaming in pain, or begging not to go on because he or she suffered 
from a weak heart, etc.128
 While it was predicted from pre-experiment surveys of 
comparable subjects, as well as of mental health professionals, that only 
one out of a hundred people would administer a shock up to 450 volts - 
where it was marked “DANGER: SEVERE SHOCK,” and by which 
time the learner (confederate) would have protested, complained of 
pain, screamed in agony, then become completely silent – 65% of 
Milgram’s first pool of subjects went all the way to the maximum 
shock. Milgram also found that the relative authority of the person in 
125  For a comprehensive review of the principal research in situationism, and an 
analysis of its application to a wide variety of  historical and current events, see Jon 
Hanson and David Yosifson, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U.PA. L. REV. 
129, 149-79, 202-85 (2003) (arguing that much that passes for rational analysis in 
economics and politics is, in fact, the result of  responses to situations that we need to 
make ourselves  feel comfortable with automatic, emotionally based decisions that we 
have already made subconsciously). 
126  Supra note 50. 
127 Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to 
Authority, 18 HUM. REL. 57, 74-75 (1965); Stanley Milgram, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 
(1974). 
128  Id. 
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charge of the experiment (such as the professor, in the above case) was 
directly correlated to the proportion of “teachers” who would dispense 
the full 450 volts. Also, when one credible person in charge was 
replaced by two such authorities, the percentage of “teachers” who fully 
cooperated was obliterated.129
Dr. Philip Zimbardo of Stanford University, creator of the famous 
1971 “Stanford Prison Experiment,”130 argues that each and every one 
of us can be made to engage in behavior we would otherwise deem 
ourselves incapable of—given the right circumstances. Zimbardo details 
such circumstances, amongst which are a “cover story” under which the 
objectionable behavior is justified; relatable roles for the subjects to 
play (such as teacher/learner in Milgram’s experiment; prison 
guard/prisoner in his own); some sort of obligation to carry out the 
behavior; responsibility for any negative consequences diverted away 
from the subject; and a gradual increase in the nature of the situation 
from reasonable to perverse (including both the level of shock and the 
authority of the professor in Milgram’s experiment).131
Zimbardo’s groundbreaking 1971 experiment illustrated the extent 
to which extraordinary behavior can arise from a given situation. In his 
study, participants with no prior experience or exposure to prisons, were 
to take on the roles of guards or prisoners in a simulated prison 
environment, set up in a campus class room building, for a period of two 
weeks. Prisoners inhabited the setting at all times, while guards worked 
8 hour shifts, but neither were taught how to perform their roles. What 
transpired was beyond anyone’s expectations—normal young men 
acting as guards began to aggressively torment and humiliate those 
acting as prisoners, and many of the otherwise healthy students acting as 
prisoners experienced severe stress and even breakdowns; the study had 
to be terminated after a mere six days.132 Perhaps most telling was 
Zimbardo’s own transformation into a harsh and uncaring Prison 
Superintendent, unbeknownst to himself.133 The “Good Samaritan” 
129.   Id. 
130. .See P.G. Zimbardo, C. Haney, C. Banks, and D. Jaffe, “The Mind is a 
Formidable Jailer: A Piradellian Prison. The NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 38 
(April 8, 1973); P.G. Zimbardo, C. Maslach, and C. Haney, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT: GENESIS, TRANSFORMATION, CONSEQUENCES, in T. 
Blass (Ed.) OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, 
193 (Earlbaum Publishing, Mahwah, NJ 1999); available at www.prisonexp.org. 
131.   Id. 
132.   Id. 
  133.  Philip G. Zimbardo, A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: 
Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators., in Arthur Miller 
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experiment at Princeton Theological Seminary, discussed at p. 670, 
supra, is yet another example of situationally driven moral reasoning. 
And, I would argue, the “social contexts” that permeate large 
corporations and the law firms that represent them, described by Mark 
A. Sargent, which lead to his pessimistic view of the potential impact of 
the SEC’s Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,134 is an 
archetypal example of situationism at work. 
d.  The Danger of “Downshifting” 
Making choices and exercising judgment produces stress.  Making 
morally charged choices, or choices in situations where one feels 
personally threatened, produces a high level of stress.  The more 
stressed we are the less likely we are to engage our cognitive processes, 
and the more likely we are to rely, unthinkingly, on our expectations, 
desires, and other emotion laden memories.135  Stress produces physical 
and psychological reactions within our body.136  Among our reactions to 
stress is the release of several hormones in the brain, including 
adrenaline, noradrenalin, and cortisol.137  Increases in adrenaline and 
noradrenalin in the brain are generally associated with stress perceived 
as a challenge which we have the ability to meet, rather than as a threat.  
It can strengthen us to handle the challenge.138  Such stress is not 
particularly harmful to the body.139
However, under conditions of persistent or unreasonably high 
stress, the body secretes excessive amounts of cortisol.140  High levels of 
cortisol inhibit cognitive functioning, and can lead to the inability to 
distinguish between important and unimportant elements of an 
experience, or to feelings of despair.141  Thus, constant or unreasonably 
(Ed.) THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL: UNDERSTANDING OUR CAPACITY 
FOR KINDNESS AND CRUELTY, manuscript at 14-15 (New York, Guilford Publishing, in 
press, 2004). 
134.  Mark A.Sargent, supra note  35 
 135. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 167. 
 136. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 70. 
 137. Id. at 71. 
 138. Id. at 72. 
 139. Id. at 70. 
 140. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 71. 
 141. SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 38 (“Chronic high cortisol levels can lead to the 
destruction of neurons in the hippocampus associated with learning and memory.  Even 
the short term stress-related elevation of cortisol in the hippocampus can lead to the 
inability to distinguish between the important and the unimportant elements of a 
memorable event.”); SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 243-44. 
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high levels of stress can have very negative effects on learning.142  They 
can impede our capacity to perceive patterns and form memories.143  
When our brains perceive a situation as threatening and we do not feel 
able to resolve it satisfactorily, we do what some psychologists have 
called “downshifting,” to focus on the perceived threat.144 When we 
“downshift” we narrow our focus and limit the incoming stimuli which 
we consider in order to engage our more primitive self-protective 
response mechanism.145  
In such situations, the brain is also less able to engage in open-
ended thinking and connect the perceived experience with the full array 
of neural connections that might otherwise be available to us to 
formulate a response.  Rather than engage the neocortical brain with its 
power to abstract, analogize, consider broader and more subtle external 
and internal cues, and develop new connections and responses necessary 
for resolving the threatening situation, we get “stuck.” At that point, the 
brain’s problem solving mechanism may shut down.  We feel helpless, 
fatigued, even a sense of despair, and are unable to distinguish between 
important and unimportant elements in the environment, or to access our 
open-ended reasoning power.  Our brain resorts to recall primarily from 
its more primitive, survival oriented reptilian and limbic systems.146  
Responding through those systems leaves us with limited tools: the 
“relentless unreasoning force” of implicit emotional memory with 
which to understand the situation,147 “automatic actions, convictions 
without intellect, and hunches whose reasons follow later or not at 
all”148 and fight-or-flight as our arsenal of responses.  We become 
defensive, even phobic, and tend to act precipitously.  “When we 
downshift, we revert to the tried and true, and follow old beliefs and 
behaviors regardless of what information the road signs provide.”149
 142. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 243-44 (“[T]this impairment [problem learning 
and remembering fear] can be produced by damaging a single structure within the 
amygdala, known as the lateral nucleus.”). 
 143. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 71. 
 144. Id. at 69-70. 
 145. Id.; see also SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 242-44 for a discussion of how a 
prolonged stressful environment can have deleterious effects on the brain and cause 
neuron loss. 
 146. SYLWESTER, supra note 48 at 38; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 73, 76-77; 
SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 242-44. 
 147. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 118. 
 148. Id. at 112. 
 149. Id. at 70.  For a further discussion of emotion, learning, and downshifting, see  
SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 45 and 73; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 69-70; and 
discussion supra pp. 659-60. 
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e. Avoiding the Dangers of Downshifting 
Zimbardo argues that while “‘a few bad apples may spoil the barrel 
(filled with good fruit/people), a vinegar barrel will always transform 
sweet cucumbers into sour pickles—regardless of the best intentions, 
resilience, and genetic nature of those cucumbers.’ So does it make 
more sense to spend resources to identify, isolate and destroy bad apples 
or to understand how vinegar works, and teach cucumbers to avoid 
undesirable vinegar barrels?”150 Unfortunately, lawyers cannot avoid the 
pickle barrel. Every form and model of lawyering that I have seen 
presents a virtual minefield of ethically challenging situations.   
 The good news, however, is that while situationally induced 
automatic responses, “hot cognition,” and downshifting are driven by 
powerful forces, they are not necessarily pre-ordained.151  For one thing, 
if we have sufficient time to reflect on the situation, and our emotional 
response to it, formulate potential solutions, and consider the 
consequences of various possible courses of action, we may be able to 
override the effects of automatic reactions.152 In addition, when our 
emotions inform us that we care about making the right decision, the 
emotional force of that motivation can overcome the tendency to act 
automatically.153 Another critical factor in determining whether we 
“downshift,” limiting our intake of data and the range of our responses, 
or instead open ourselves to expand our data intake and deploy the 
powerful analytical tools of the neo-cortex, appears to be “whether we 
see a solution to [the] problem or perceive ourselves as capable of 
resolving it.”154  
 
 
 
150. Zimbardo, supra note 133, at 14-15. 
151.  See, e.g., Lewis, et al, supra note 50, at 169-90 (discussing the process by 
which psychotherapy helps individuals re-order their implicitly learned, emotional 
memories, and replace automatic responses with more reflective ones); Ziva Kunda, 
supra note 20, at 289, 305. 
 152. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 289. 
 153. Id. at 305. 
 154. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 72. 
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III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING                                             
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW SCHOOL  
A. Traditional Law School Curriculum and Pedagogy Fail to Prepare 
Students to Solve Value Laden Ethical Problems. 
The environment in which law students are immersed is rich with 
reading and interpreting statutes and court decisions, analyzing text, 
considering the phrasing of an appropriate rule of law, and arguing for 
its adoption against professors and colleagues.  Students are constantly 
engaged in analyzing the same type of material, deciding what the legal 
rule should be, and zealously advocating in favor of its application.155 
Socratic dialogue in our classes is emotionally charged, as students are 
challenged to come up with arguments facing their professors, 
surrounded by their peers.  By implicit learning, i.e., by doing, and 
being critiqued, rather than by intentionally studying the process, and by 
repetition, students working in that atmosphere learn principles and 
processes of analysis of statutes, regulations, and court opinions and 
how to build an argument in support of the client’s position.  Their 
neural networks form patterns of implicit memory that are repeatedly 
reinforced, to follow or distinguish precedent whenever they must 
analyze legal problems.  Because they work primarily from appellate 
opinions, they are “programmed” to look to predetermined sources, e.g., 
the findings of the court below, the appellate court’s identification of the 
relevant facts, or the professor’s hypothetical, for all of the relevant 
facts.  In addition, the emotion of both the Socratic dialogue in class and 
exams have reinforced those implicit memories.  They may forget most 
of the particular legal doctrines learned in various substantive courses; 
however, forever after, whenever their senses perceive a problem as a 
legal problem, their brains will call on the patterns of neural 
connections—the memories—that were created implicitly in law school, 
about how to respond.  Noticeably absent from the explicit teaching, 
except in the course on ethics, is any consideration of values.  When the 
legal problem is instrumentalist—how to accomplish our client’s goal—
the explicit and implicit knowledge garnered in law school about how to 
solve legal problems stands our students, as lawyers, in good stead, 
because the answer involves making an effective argument for the 
 155. In each law school course, students analyze appellate opinions using 
substantially the same tools and methods. 
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applicability of a legal rule to achieve that goal.  The difference between 
the particular raw material presented by the client in “real life,” and the 
“hypos” faced in law school, are not terribly problematic, because the 
concepts and analytical skills that were so effectively encoded in 
memory en route to the J.D. are readily transferable to most legal 
domains.  Drawing on those memories will, generally, produce valuable 
information for solving instrumentalist legal problems.  However, when 
the problem is not how to do something, but rather whether to do it, 
when it involves values or relationships among people—which much of 
a lawyer’s work does—neither the explicit, nor the implicit knowledge 
learned in law school is of much help.  Among the factors that the rule-
based examination of the problem does not consider are the future 
relationships between and among the parties, the values of the relevant 
players, including the lawyer, and the potential impact on third parties.  
Relationships and values, however, implicate emotion as much, or more, 
than cognitive analysis. 
As we have seen, most of our moral choices are initiated 
automatically, before our cognitive processes can be engaged, by the 
values, social intuitions, expectations, and needs which we have 
developed over many years of daily living and implicit, emotionally rich 
learning.  They are in place before students arrive at law school.  
Moreover, the more stress we experience when confronted by a moral or 
ethical dilemma, the more likely we are to simply rely on those 
emotional memories, and the less likely we are to engage our cognitive 
resources.  The lawyers in the problems at the beginning of this paper 
probably studied the rules of professional responsibility, yet they were 
unable to overcome the pressures of the situations in which they found 
themselves, even to the point of considering the ethical issues, and 
developing an appropriate problem solving strategy.  Nevertheless, 
while our mental-emotional edifice, constructed over many years is 
powerful, our pre-adult experiences are not necessarily our destiny.156 
But it is not easy to change.  Simply studying and learning moral 
reasoning won’t do it. 
After childhood, “emotional learning doesn’t stop, but it slows.   
[O]ften the only emotional learning one sees after childhood is the 
reinforcement of existing fundamentals.”157  Lewis et al suggest that 
 156. Id. at 829; LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 169-90 (discussing the process by 
which psychotherapy helps individuals re-order their implicitly learned emotional 
memories); ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 289, 305. 
 157. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 163. 
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three to five years, sometimes more, of therapy is usually required to 
make significant change in adults’ emotional responses.158  Haidt 
suggests “[y]ears of. . . .implicit learning, coupled with explicit 
discussion, should gradually tune up intuitions. . . about justice, rights, 
and fairness, leading perhaps to an automatic tendency to look at 
problems from multiple perspectives. . . .”159  But he ventures no guess 
as to how long that might take.   
The legal education described by Friedland’s survey results,160 and 
familiar to all of us, does not seem likely to serve those goals.  Worse 
yet, it may, as I think the examples at the beginning of this article 
demonstrate, be antithetical to them. 
For most law students, their exposure to matters of professional 
responsibility is limited to taking one course in the subject, and in 
preparing for and taking the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination (MPRE).161 Although the American Bar Association has, 
since 1974, required as a condition of accreditation that a law school 
require each of its graduates to complete a course in professional 
responsibility,162 there is little incentive for students to really “dig into” 
the subject, even at the rule-based level. 163
To the extent that the course is taught in a manner similar to that 
used in other subject matter courses, the emotional experience of the 
students is minimal.164 Certainly, there is always some emotional 
connection when one is called upon in class, and with final exams.  Yet, 
 158. Id. at 187. 
 159. Haidt, supra note 50, at 829; see also, Eleanor W. Myers, Simple Truths about 
Moral Education, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 823, 835-36 (1996); Myers, supra note 37, at 409-
10, 414, 416-17. 
 160. Friedland, supra note 29, at 19-23, 27-30. 
 161. The career plans of our students do not incentivize them to pay particular 
attention to issues of ethics and professional responsibility.  In the more than ten years 
that I have been teaching, during all of which time I have served on my law school’s 
Career Planning and Placement Committee, and indeed in the twenty-five years that I 
practiced before that, I have heard of only one law firm, during one hiring season, that 
considered an applicant’s responses to questions of professional responsibility during 
the hiring process, or paid particular attention to the applicant’s grade in that course. 
 162. ABA Standard 302(a) (iv), Standards for Approval of Law Schools. 
 163. Law schools have not rushed to adopt Professor Rhode’s proposed “pervasive 
method” for educating law students about professional responsibility by including some 
problem set and important class time for discussion of professional responsibility issues 
throughout the curriculum. Rhode, supra note 16, at 4-5.  Rather, professional 
responsibility is generally a two credit course offered to second and third year students, 
frequently after they have taken and passed, with the aid of a bar review course, the 
MPRE. 
 164. For a discussion of Friedland’s findings see supra note 29. 
  
684 Q L R  [Vol. 23:643 
 
 
in class, and when the exam is comprised of the standard essay and/or 
multiple choice questions, the student is required to identify and apply 
the rule of professional conduct implicated in a given fact pattern.  The 
emotional connection is with knowing and applying the correct rule in a 
situation in which the student knows, in advance, that the fact pattern 
raises one or more ethical questions.  Students’ emotional engagement is 
not with seeking to discover and understand the full context, identifying 
and creating options, discerning the ethical choice, and acting on it by 
exercising judgment to decide what to do, and communicating that 
judgment to a client and/or supervisor who might prefer a different 
response, knowing that she may face adverse consequences from her 
choices.  Rather, the only thing at risk is the student’s grade in a course 
she may see as having little impact on her future.   
Legal problems encountered throughout the law school curriculum, 
outside of Professional Responsibility class, are generally taken from 
the instrumentalist perspective, and do not consider matters of 
professional responsibility, i.e., they ask only how to do something.  
Matters of professional responsibility are, inherently, normative, i.e., 
asking whether to do something.  Thus, to the extent that our students 
carry memories of issues relevant to ethical decision making, they are 
primarily explicitly learned, “taxon” memories of specific rules learned 
in their one class on ethics and professional responsibility.165
 165. Of course, there have been numerous creative and potentially effective efforts 
by talented and dedicated teachers of professional responsibility to design and teach 
professional responsibility within a pedagogic framework that do exactly what Haidt, 
Caine & Caine, Schoen, Blasi, and Myers, suggest, including engaging the students in 
the process of exercising judgment in multiple contexts, and making visible their 
reasoning process in a safe and supportive environment so that it can be carefully 
analyzed, and re-examined in the light of thoughtful feedback.  See sources cited supra 
note 50.  See also Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the 
Most Important Subject in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719 (1998) (urging that law 
schools promote the importance of legal ethics by making it a required, three credit, first 
year, first semester course and an upper level course, as well as incorporate ethics into 
all other classes); Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 
WM. & M. L. REV. 357 (1998) (promoting the idea of teaching legal ethics from a 
“contextual” standpoint rather than as a survey course as being more effective because it 
emphasizes the importance of context when making decisions and gives students more 
time to develop skills); Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. L. 
ETHICS, 33 (1996) (advocating the need to develop the capacity to make well-reasoned, 
ethical decisions in lawyers and the importance of teaching this to students beyond the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility); SYMPOSIUM, supra at note 35.  
Nevertheless, it seems to me that, within the three years of law school, a single exposure 
to professional responsibility in a two or three credit mandatory, upper level course, 
often taught after the students have passed the MPRE, challenges even the very best of 
  
2004] TEACHING LAW STUDENTS TO BE ETHICAL 685 
 
 
If we return to consider the problems which introduced this paper 
in light of what cognitive science teaches us about learning and acting 
we will see that they have several things in common: 
1.  Each of them was perceived as carrying significant risk to the 
lawyer. 
2.  In each case the lawyer had neither practice addressing such 
challenging problems, nor had they an apparently readily available 
source of support for analyzing or addressing the problem. 
3.  Each lawyer “downshifted.” (a) They acted as if there was no 
ethical issue to consider, despite their knowledge of the rules.  Denial 
and avoidance are clear examples of “flight.” (b) The problem solving 
behavior they chose to employ is perfectly explainable in terms of the 
“three principles” that were imbedded in their implicit memory in law 
school.  They acted automatically, reverting to the tried and true.166
If it is true that our reactions in the face of moral or ethical 
questions are most significantly automatic, driven by social intuitions, 
which are primarily governed by elaborately encoded, implied 
emotional memories, 167 and if the legal academy is concerned about our 
students’ performance as ethical lawyers, then law schools are faced 
with a dilemma.  On one hand, if students come to us with intuitions 
that incline them to be reflective and responsible about moral and 
ethical issues, to look at problems from multiple perspectives, to search, 
and then to act consistently with the morally correct decision,168 we 
want to reinforce them, and also give them the tools to enable them to 
be both professionally responsible, and zealous and effective advocates 
for their clients.  On the other hand, if they come to the law school with 
intuitions that do not incline them to consider issues of ethics and 
professional responsibility, other than perhaps as traps to avoid, rather 
teachers to really engage the students at an emotional level. C.f., Frenkel, supra note 37, 
at 20-23 (arguing that although professional responsibility is the only required subject in 
all law schools, it is difficult to teach because there is not a uniform format, duration or 
teaching method, there is not always institutional support in the form of resources and 
credit hours, and there is often a great deal of student resistance). Moreover, by limiting 
the teaching of professional responsibility to the course in “Professional Responsibility,” 
we run the risk of limiting our students’ ability to apply the principles and practices we 
teach in that course to other contexts. See e.g., HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 139, at 
62 (arguing that the ability to transfer knowledge from one situation to another depends 
upon the context in which it is first learned). 
 166. See supra pp. 678-80. 
 167. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 189-90. 
 168. Haidt, supra note 50, at 829; LEWIS, ET AL., supra note 50, at 169-90 
(discussing the process by which psychotherapy helps individuals re-order their 
implicitly learned memories). 
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than reinforcing those intuitions their legal education should seek to 
enhance their sensitivity and responsiveness to the important role that 
those issues play in our profession, while assuring them that to do so is 
not to surrender their effectiveness as advocates for their clients.  Law 
schools should help them acquire the skills to pursue both goals 
simultaneously, and the emotional strength to do so.  That is, we should 
strive to create new explicit and implicit emotional memory of being 
ethically responsible, while exercising the skills necessary to effective 
problem solving as advocates for their clients. 
Motivation is the key to attitude change.  Attitude change is driven 
by the need to affirm oneself as a good person.  Self affirmation can be 
achieved by changing one’s attitude about one’s behavior—either 
changing the behavior so that it comports with prior values, or changing 
one’s values as they relate to the extant behaviors.169
As long as law schools teach students to value effective legal 
arguments without regard to the moral and ethical consequences of their 
actions, they will not be motivated to value embedding ethical and 
moral considerations in their professional behavior as lawyers. 
B. How Experts Solve Novel and Complex Problems 
“Experts” are people who can understand and solve problems that 
others—non-experts—cannot.  Thus, it might be valuable in trying to 
ascertain how to go about learning to solve complex ethical problems to 
examine what it is about “expertise” that enables experts, generically, to 
do so. 
As described by Gary L. Blasi170 and Donald A. Schön,171 experts 
seem to be able to leapfrog over several levels of detailed analysis to 
identify and engage patterns of apparently related information directly 
to a given problem, and also to matters that are facially different, yet 
analogous, and thus useful for the solution.  Their memories include a 
combination of a deep body of subject matter data, and “experience,” 
the accumulated knowledge from actually using the data in various 
situations over time (i.e., in context).  Accessing these memories 
permits them to compare and contrast the characteristics of the 
 169. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 218-23 (reviewing the consistent research that 
supports the conclusion that motivation to believe that one is a good person drives 
changes in behavior and attitude about one’s behavior). 
 170. Blasi, supra note 28. 
 171. DONALD A. SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS 
THINK IN ACTION (Basic Books 1983). 
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presenting problem with those of the many problems with which they 
have engaged in the past.  Schön describes this as engaging in a 
“reflective conversation with a unique and uncertain situation.” 172  This 
process enables the experts to construct patterns, or “mental models” 
that permit them to move forward towards a solution. 173
Critical to the experts’ approach to a problem are the following: (1) 
a deep foundation of factual knowledge in the domain; (2) experience, 
i.e., working with the data in context; and (3) understanding of the 
conceptual framework that relates to the domain.  Given these attributes, 
experts can see patterns in the data that might not be obvious to others 
and thus recognize when a “given” problem actually has critical 
unidentified attributes—perhaps even a different foundational 
problem—that affect achievement of the desired goal.174
How is such expertise developed? 
 1.  Elaborately Encoded, Implicit Memory 
Explicit, or taxon, memory created by intentional studying of 
relevant material is one factor.  But, experts’ knowledge cannot be 
reduced to a fund of explicitly learned data.  Rather, it is implicitly 
learned, contextualized, and organized around core concepts.175  For the 
professionals whose work was examined by Schön, all of the problems 
presented challenges that they had not directly encountered before.  
However, they were able to engage the problem in context, and find 
concepts from their experience that contributed to developing a solution.  
In so doing, they continually re-examined and reflected on their 
understanding of the problem, as well as the appropriateness of their 
approach to solving it,176 each time elaborately encoding new patterns of 
 172. Id. at 130 (The expert responds to a situation in action based upon her 
education, training and experience in using that knowledge in context. That action 
produces consequences which may include unexpected ones (i.e., the situation “talks 
back” to the expert), and the expert responds to that “back-talk.” The expert uses this 
process to build towards a solution.). 
 173. Blasi, supra note 28, at 335-36, 344; SCHÖN, supra note 171, at 268-69; See 
also, HOW PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE AND SCHOOL, 31-33 (John D. 
Bransford, et. al eds., National Academy Press 2000). 
 174. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 45-47 (The “virtuoso” or expert with 
adaptive expertise, treats the client’s articulation of the problem with respect, but also as 
a point of departure for further exploration.). 
 175. Id. at 13, 36-38, 48. 
 176. SCHÖN, supra note 171, at 54-56 (examples of major league baseball pitcher, 
and experienced jazz musician, both of whom must examine their performance as it 
relates to the performance of others, and evaluate and adjust as they are performing), 
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neural connections that reinforced the core relationships among the data.  
Without a vast store of elaborately encoded, implicit knowledge, such 
an approach would not have been possible.  The creation of implicit 
memory by repeated elaborate encodings from different, yet similar 
contexts not only enhances the internal bond of the patterns of neural 
connections, but also highlights the core similarities among related 
neural patterns, thus strengthening the connections among those 
representing the concepts central to the memory.177 
 2.  Adaptive Expertise and Metacognition 
Some experts simply possess large funds of domain knowledge but 
are unable to apply it to matters outside of those areas.  Chess masters, 
for example, have been shown to have a keen ability to remember the 
placement of pieces on the board far better than they can remember 
similar non-chess related patterns.178 Other experts, such as those 
studied by Schön, are able to adapt their knowledge to the demands of 
new and different external situations.  They are said to have “adaptive 
expertise.”179
Experts with adaptive expertise see the presenting problem as the 
starting point for exploration, an exploration that may lead to a 
reconfiguration of the problem, itself, as well as the development of a 
path leading to an effective solution.180 Key to the difference between 
experts with and without adaptive expertise is metacognition.  
Metacognition refers to the ability to understand one’s own thought 
and 128-36 (reviewing the preceding discussion of  that same process by architects and 
psychotherapists). 
 177. See discussion “Implicit Memory,” supra pp. 665-66; SCHACTER, supra note 
54 at 56, 60, 63 (recall of explicitly learned memory depends upon the similarity 
between the encoding process and the recall cue; while elaborately encoded, or implicit, 
memory, being susceptible to recall by myriad cues, has a much higher likelihood of 
being recalled)  Another example of the critical value of contextualized learning is that 
actors don’t simply memorize lines, but rather seek to understand the person they are 
portraying, and the emotional environment and impact on that person of the situation in 
which they find themselves.  SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 49. Pinker further explains 
that access to long term memory—“access consciousness”—is a function of the 
“richness of present-tense [i.e., sensory] awareness” attention and emotion  at the time 
of the experience, and relevance at the time of need for recall. Pinker, supra note 42, at 
138-45.
 178. Blasi, supra note 28, at 335; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 48-49. 
 179. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 46-48. 
 180. Id. at 32. 
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processes,181 including the nature, scope, and limitations on one’s 
knowledge, and the willingness to seek to overcome the limitations by 
seeking out new sources of relevant expertise.182 To avoid such 
automatic responses as downshifting, but instead employ the best of 
one’s analytical and problem solving skills, including an objective 
evaluation of one’s own resources, as well as their limitations, and then 
seek out other resources necessary to create an effective solution, 
requires motivation, competence and confidence. 
IV.  BUILDING BETTER LAWYERS THROUGH CONTEXTUALLY RICH, 
EMOTIONALLY ENGAGED LEARNING183
A.  What Would It Take?  
In order to make the best use of their analytical abilities in the face 
of ethically opaque situations, students need to be motivated to do so, 
and to understand the historically developed “intuitions” that are 
pushing or pulling them in particular directions.  They need to have the 
skills and confidence to engage in the type of analysis that encompasses 
both values and traditional legal analysis, and the courage to make 
professionally responsible choices in the face of conflicting values.  And 
they should learn how to seek and obtain support when they need to 
work through problems freighted with ethical issues, as most 
practitioners do. 
To achieve those results, law faculty will need to construct a 
learning environment specifically designed for that purpose. 
 181. SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 85. See Robin A. Boyle, Employing Active 
Learning Techniques and Metacognition in Law School: Shifting Energy from Professor 
to Student, 81 UNIV. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 1, 7-18 (2003). 
 182. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 12-13. 
 183. See Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting 
Conversations about Women, the Academy and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE  J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 119 (1997) (combining the critiques of the model of lawyer as 
“gladiator” promoted in law school and the profession’s marginalization of women and 
people of color to argue that the model of lawyer should be recast to that of problem 
solver, which would better address the needs of lawyers in society and serve to better 
include all); Lerner, supra note 28; SYMPOSIUM, supra note 35. 
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B.  What Would Emotionally Engaged Learning in Law School Look 
Like?  
1.  Let Them In On The Secret. 
For more than ten years, I have been teaching in a law school 
clinical program in which the students represent real clients.  I also 
supervise externs, students whose clinical experience is with a legal 
organization outside of the law school, where all of their case 
supervision is by the organization’s lawyers.  In our clinic my clinical 
faculty colleagues and I supervise students representing clients of our 
law school-based “teaching law office.” In the clinic seminar, we 
include a class explicitly designed to introduce our students to the idea 
that they come to their work with a broad array of values, assumptions, 
judgments, expectations, emotional needs, etc.  With our externs we use 
the requirement that they maintain journals, which we read, and meet 
with us on a regular basis to introduce them to the importance of their 
own values and needs in assessing their sensory experiences, analyzing 
situations, and making judgments.  We try to demonstrate that their 
values and emotional needs are based upon a lifetime of experience, 
their particular lifetime of experience, but not that of others—even 
others as similar to themselves as their classmates, let alone as different 
from themselves as their clients.  These issues include, of course, ethnic, 
gender, religious, and class stereotypes, but also a hierarchy of values 
covering a myriad of topics.  We discuss, explicitly, theories about how 
these “social intuitions” influence what they see and hear, and how they 
interact with others, and make judgments. We ask them to consider 
these issues as they go about the work of representing their clients; and 
we urge them, too, to be patient with themselves, rather than overly self- 
critical, as they work to become aware of what forces are influencing 
their decision making, and gain control of them.  Throughout the 
semester in class and in supervision meetings we try to raise questions 
to help them see where and why their internal self is influencing their 
analytical and interpersonal work.  Our semester is only fourteen weeks 
long, but however skeptical and resistant the student may be when we 
introduce the topic, most are convinced by the end of the semester that 
they are not the “analytical machine” that they had previously supposed.  
And, I have had many experiences of students who, by the end of the 
term, were able to articulate some of the subtle forces operating within 
themselves as they struggled with their clients’ problems. 
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By helping our students to understand these principles, and 
working with them to help them experience those forces in action in the 
safe environment of our classes and supervised clinical work, we 
increase their ability to understand and control their impact. 
 2. Reinforce Social Intuitions That Support Ethical Behavior and 
Empathy, and the Appropriateness of Moral Considerations for the 
Zealous Advocate. 
 The history of the legal profession’s role in representing 
unpopular individuals and causes, and its history of ethical conduct, 
while not without blemish, as well as my own observations as both 
lawyer and law professor, leads me to think that the problem is not that 
law school attracts only those who possess only selfish, competitive, or 
uncaring social intuitions. Research demonstrates that most people have 
intuitions towards empathy and justice.184And, where getting  “the right 
answer” is important we are motivated to pursue that goal.185  Perhaps 
the problem is that law students learn only tools for their role as 
instrumentalist lawyer, and not those that support their pro-social 
intuitions. Perhaps if, in addition to tools for the traditional role of 
zealous advocate, law school provided them with skills with which to 
recognize the emotional pressures created by challenging professional 
situations, and to design solutions that would support both their need to 
represent their clients effectively, and their own pro-social intuitions, 
they would be better able to make choices that would lead them to 
recognizing and rejecting unethical or unprofessional actions, and 
insisting on pursuing the “right,” i.e., ethical, professionally responsible 
choice. 
3.  Moral Diversity, Open Discussion, and Reflective Lawyering  in 
a Law School Class. 
According to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, beyond the mastery of 
traditional lawyering skills, our students need to learn to pose such 
questions, as: 
 184.  See Steven L. Blader and Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Empathy: What Motivates 
People to Help Others? in Michael Ross and Dale Miller (eds.) THE JUSTICE 
MOTIVATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE, 226, 227-28 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002).  
 185.    Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 289. 
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What are these parties trying to accomplish? [I.e., What are 
their real goals, needs, interests, and priorities?] What are the 
likely/possible needs or interests of other parties who may be 
involved in the case or in important, ongoing or potential, 
relationships with one or more of the parties?  What is really at 
stake?  What are the legal, social, economic, political, 
psychological, moral, or ethical risks and benefits of litigation? 
Of non-litigated outcomes? What other considerations might the 
client be willing to entertain, if they were brought to awareness? 
Are there ways to satisfy our client’s needs as well as all, or 
some, of the needs of others? What other arrangements might be 
better to deal with this problem? Why might they be better or 
worse?186
I submit that they also need to ask themselves: 
Are there motivations or expectations that I have that are 
driving me toward, or away from, recommending, or even 
considering, particular strategies or tactics? Are there individual 
values or relationships, including, but not limited to those of my 
client, that might be impacted differently by our selection of 
strategy or tactics? 
Beyond their mastery of formal analytical and argumentative skills, 
students should be able to consider the values, or social intuitions that 
underlie the choices they make, especially with respect to issues of 
professional responsibility, and consider perspectives other than their 
own, or that of the instrumentalist view of lawyering.187  They need to 
be motivated to seek a morally and ethically appropriate solution, not 
merely to construct a plausible argument that leads to a pre-determined 
result.  They need to have confidence that they can act in a morally 
appropriate way, in order to avoid downshifting in the face of morally 
challenging situations. 
To achieve such goals, our students must become comfortable 
dealing with what Jonathan Haidt, Evan Rosenberg, and Holly Hom 
have referred to as “moral diversity.”188  However, as Haidt, Rosenberg, 
 186. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously: A 
Response to the Attorney General, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14, 15 (1999). 
 187. Frenkel, supra note 37, at 41-42. 
 188. Jonathan Haidt, et. al., Differentiating Diversities: Moral Diversity is Not Like 
Other Kinds, 33 J.  APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1 (2003) (defining “moral diversity” as “the state 
of a group when a substantial percentage of its members . . . does not value the most 
valued moral goods of the community. Moral goods are social, personal, or spiritual 
obligations (e.g., justice, social harmony, self-actualization, piety, chastity) to which one 
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and Hom point out, there is a substantial body of social psychological 
research that indicates that moral diversity in a group makes it difficult 
for members to work together, because differences based upon “culture 
and world view” lead to “desires for ostracism and punishment.”189 
Their own studies of University of Virginia undergraduates confirm that 
moral diversity reduces desires for interaction more than does 
demographic diversity.190
At the same time, however, “participants [in their study] saw a 
special value in diversity in educational contexts. . . . [They] seemed to 
be saying that exposure to [moral] differences in the controlled and safe 
setting of a class room was desirable.”191 The fact that students in the 
Haidt, Rosenberg, and Hom study seemed to appreciate the value, and 
have less fear, of moral diversity in an academic setting suggests that 
just such a venue, or perhaps a law school classroom, might well be 
appropriate for the introduction, open discussion, and reflection upon 
morally diverse values. 
Yet, practice does not necessarily make perfect.  Rather, it makes 
persistent.  If we want students to consider with open minds the positive 
weight of the moral values of others that differ from their own, and to 
appreciate the implications to others, as well as the effectiveness for 
their clients, of various behaviors, only feedback, discussion, reflection, 
and follow-up, led by someone skilled at evaluating their work, and 
communicating about it with them non-judgmentally, are likely to 
produce that result.192  And they need the opportunity to reflect, 
reconsider, and try again.193 Feedback and reflection also teaches 
flexibility, transferability of knowledge, and that learning is built upon 
appeals to justify or criticize the practices and behaviors of others, and which are felt to 
be binding on all people. . . . Moral goods are experienced as affectively laden self-
evident truths or intuitions. . . .”); see also id. at 5. 
 189. Id. at 6. 
 190. Id. at 30. 
 191. Haidt, et. al., supra note 118, at 30. 
 192. Cf. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50 at 169-90 (discussing the lengthy and difficult 
process of psychotherapy in revising the implicitly learned neural code that directs our 
emotional lives); Haidt, supra note 50, at 829 (“Creating a community in which moral 
talk was ubiquitous and in which adults model good moral thinking. And by talking 
about evidence, justifications, and mitigating factors [with discourse partners who are 
respected for their wisdom and judgment] more nuanced and ultimately more reasonable 
judgments are likely to be produced.”). 
 193. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 58-60. 
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prior learning.194  Feedback and reflection thus builds metacognition, the 
ability to understand one’s own cognitive processes.195
4.  Two Models of Instruction. 
a. “Live Client” Clinics 
Law school clinics in which students represent real clients offer a 
unique opportunity to learn how to figure out what really is the problem, 
to uncover what really is at stake, what unidentified relationships may 
be critical to one or another of the parties as they work towards a 
solution of the problem, etc.  Student lawyers must examine and 
understand the problem as presented by the client, theorize as to 
potential solutions, plan and carry out legal research and factual 
investigation, remain open to ongoing re-examination of the critical 
issues, identify limits in their own knowledge and overcome those 
limits, integrate knowledge from other disciplines or domains, learn, 
build on their prior learning, exercise judgment, make choices and 
experience their consequences.  Moreover, as Eleanor W. Myers has 
noted in assessing her simulation-based course, “Experience exerts a 
powerful influence over the exercise of discretion.  Experiential learning 
is critical to moral development.”196  “[I]t is not until students actually 
experience the reality of practice that they begin to internalize and make 
their own moral and ethical judgments that are at the core of 
practice.”197 Clinics, in which the students represent clients in real 
matters under the close supervision of experienced lawyers/teachers, 
thus provide a quintessential locale for emotional engagement of law 
students in factually complex matters, challenging them to identify and 
grapple with issues of professional responsibility.  They also provide the 
opportunity for frequent feedback and occasional modeling from 
experts.  In such an atmosphere implicit, emotional learning is likely to 
take place. 
At the same time, because they are “live,” every case is different 
and quite unpredictable at the outset.  Given such unpredictability, it 
 194. Id. at 68-69. 
 195. Id. at 67. 
 196. MYERS, SIMPLE TRUTHS, supra note 152, at 835; Myers, supra note 37, at 403-
04. 
 197. MYERS, SIMPLE TRUTHS, supra note 152, at 836. 
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would be difficult to plan a problem solving or professional 
responsibility curricular thread solely around live client clinics. 
b.  Problem-Based Learning 
Between live client clinics and Langdellian reliance on appellate 
opinions there should be a pedagogy, or pedagogies, that will enable law 
students to engage in contextually rich, emotionally engaging, 
experiential learning.  Problem-Based Learning (P-BL)198 is one 
approach that gives us guidance on how to satisfy those needs. 
P-BL is based upon the principle that by engaging students’ 
interest and having them actively engaged in the learning process, the 
students will learn how they learn, as well as learning the concepts with 
which they are working to produce both more effective, usable 
knowledge and long term “learning capability.”199  Using P-BL, students 
develop an understanding of the facts and circumstances in which the 
problem is situated, define, or redefine, the problem(s) or goal(s), 
consider whatever competing interests may be involved, prioritize, 
identify the nature and sources of the information needed to achieve the 
goal, obtain that information, employ critical thinking, exercise 
judgment, reconsider earlier conclusions or assumptions, make and 
defend their decisions, reflect on their own learning process and results, 
and work with the situation as it evolves over time.200  Essential to the 
process is the participation of a mentor, who can assist the learners to 
remain on task, collaborate, and encourage reflection on their work as 
they proceed.201  For the reasons discussed below, P-BL can be expected 
 198. See, e.g., THE CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING (David Boud & 
Graham I. Feletti eds., 2d ed. Kogan Page 1997) (critically examining problem based 
learning in a variety of learning environments); THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED 
LEARNING: A PRACTICAL “HOW TO” FOR TEACHING UNDERGRADUATE COURSES IN ANY 
DISCIPLINE (Barbara J. Duch et al. eds., Stylus Publishing 2001) (outlining useful 
strategies for how educators can introduce problem-based learning into their courses). 
 199. Boud & Feletti, supra note 198, at 2, 4; Barbara J. Duch et al., Why Problem-
Based Learning? A Case Study of Institutional Change in Undergraduate Education, in 
THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 6. 
 200. Barbara J. Duch et al., supra note 199, at 6; Barbara J. Duch, Writing Problems 
for Deeper Understanding, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 
198, at 48-50; Boud & Feletti, supra note 198, at 1-2, Charles E. Engel, Not Just a 
Method but a Way of Learning, in THE CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, 
supra note 198, at 19. 
 201. Deborah E. Allen & Harold B. White, III, Undergraduate Group Facilitators 
to Meet the Challenges of Multiple Classroom Groups, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-
BASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 79-92; Boud & Feletti, supra note 198, at 2. 
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to produce more elaborately encoded patterns of neural connections of 
the approach to problem solving demonstrated by professionals with 
adaptive expertise, as well as the ability to examine problems from 
multiple perspectives, which is essential to professionally responsible 
conduct. 
 i.  Motivating Students 
Motivation stimulates attention and learning.202  Motivation can be 
externally generated by the expectation of rewards or punishments (i.e., 
grades).203  However, learning tends to be more powerful when its 
motivation is internally generated by the learner’s belief in the 
usefulness of the learning.204  A belief that what one is doing has real 
value to oneself or others is a powerful motivator.205 Most students 
come to law school wanting to become lawyers.  Thus, the more that 
students feel that the problems they confront in law school actually 
relate to the real world of lawyering, the greater their internal 
motivation to engage with them and the greater their learning from that 
experience.206
 ii.  Teaching Students to be Adaptive Problem Solvers 
Langdellian, case-method, teaching provides the students with all 
of the information they need from the statement of the problem to the 
facts and legal authorities available for its solution.  But lawyers seldom 
have such luxury.  Frequently, they help to clarify the question, 
investigate the facts, recognize that over time everything, even the 
 202. KUNDA, supra note 20, at 211-16; HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 60-
61; Barbara J. Duch et al., Why Problem-Based Learning? A Case Study of Institutional 
Change in Undergraduate Education, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, 
supra note 176, at 6; Boud & Feletti, supra note 198, at 1-2; Cf. SYLWESTER, supra note 
48, at 72; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 44-45 acknowledging the importance of 
motivation, but arguing that the encoding-making part of experience—is equally, if not 
more essential. 
 203. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 60. 
 204. Id. at 61. Both SYLWESTER and Caine & Caine point out that external 
motivation can actually limit a person’s internal motivation. SYLWESTER, supra note 48, 
at 75-76; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 76-77. Accord, Dewey, supra note 74, at 67 
(“There is, I think, no point in the philosophy of progressive education which is sounder 
that its emphasis upon the importance of the participation of the learner in the formation 
of the purposes which direct his activities in the learning process.”). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Dewey, supra note 74, at 67. 
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client’s goals and priorities, may change, find, or create, the legal 
principles that best support the client, and then marshal the evidence 
that best supports the application of those principles.  P-BL, by 
providing limited information at the outset of the problem calls on the 
students to engage in similar activities to those of the lawyer.  Students 
thus learn to exercise judgment to identify and obtain necessary 
information to consider the implications of change over time, both 
factually and legally, as well as relationships that might continue 
beyond the solution of the presenting problem, to understand their own 
thought processes, recognize the limits of their own knowledge, and to 
identify and secure resources appropriate to the solution of the problem 
(metacognition). 
 iii.  Collaboration 
P-BL advocates consistently urge that students be required to work 
in teams for several reasons.  First, it brings together the collective skills 
of the team members,207 demonstrating the appropriateness and value of 
collaboration to work and scholarship.208 Collaboration reduces the 
individual student’s sense of isolation, which tends to improve 
performance.209  Less isolation may produce less fear and thus, less 
“downshifting.”210 Students are likely to be motivated to be able to 
contribute to the team’s goals, thereby increasing their emotional 
engagement with the problem.211  Collaboration requires them to make 
decisions and to communicate effectively to their teammates the 
evidence and reasons supporting those decisions.212  It thereby improves 
both reasoning and communication skills.213  The process of working in 
teams also generates appreciation for differences in learning and 
 207. Barbara J. Duch et al., supra note 199, at 6. 
 208. Barbara J. Duch et al., Strategies for Using Groups, in THE POWER OF 
PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 60. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.; see discussion supra pp. 678-80. 
 211. See “Motivating Students,” supra p. 696; “The Importance of Emotion in 
Creating Memory,” supra pp. 668-70. Of course, some students may take the 
opportunity of group work to avoid responsibility and work, expecting that others will 
do it. But even that has consequences that may, if it is identified, articulated and 
addressed, provide important learning about ethical judgment. 
 212. Barbara J. Duch, Writing Problems for Deeper Understanding, in THE POWER 
OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 49-50. 
 213. Barbara J. Duch et al., supra note 199, at 6. 
  
698 Q L R  [Vol. 23:643 
 
 
communication styles, increasing social maturity.214 Collaboration can 
significantly increase one’s exposure to other perspectives, and values. 
Although most lawyers work collaboratively in addressing clients’ 
problems, in most law school course work collaboration is a violation of 
the honor code. Thus students learn, implicitly, and with powerful 
emotional stakes, not to ask for support from, or give support to, others 
in solving legal problems. In my observations, even in my 
interdisciplinary clinic in which all of the work is done in teams, 
students demonstrate that they have somehow acquired the belief that 
asking for support is a sign of weakness or incompetence. Moreover, 
law schools provide no support for creating, effectively using, or 
evaluating collaborations.  Most law students learn the skills of group 
process and collaboration only by chance. 
Collaboration, however, is an immeasurably valuable tool in 
addressing ethical problems. When Milgram varied his electric shock 
experiments in ways that involved a third person being present, even 
those that were known to be confederates of the “experimenter” the 
subject almost always refused to proceed to highest level of shock for 
the “learner.”215 The support of colleagues, friends, family, teachers, 
therapists, spiritual advisors, indeed anyone that we trust, can be of 
immeasurable help in sorting out our feelings, values, needs, and 
expectations, as well as clarifying the evidence and issues, and 
identifying options. We need to inculcate in our students an acceptance 
that seeking support to discuss one’s feelings about the appropriateness 
of behaviors that one is being asked to condone, especially when one 
feels any qualms about the ethics or morality of the action, is an 
appropriate element of the exercise of professional judgment and not a 
sign of incompetence or disloyalty. 
Carol Buckner, for example, uses small groups (3-5 students) 
within her large first year civil procedure course to develop not only the 
ability of the students to work cooperatively, but also better 
understanding by all students of the core concepts of the course, 
individual accountability, and self-directed learning—all important 
qualities for lawyers.216 In her course, the instructor selects the groups to 
 214. Id.; Barbara J. Duch et al., Strategies for Using Groups, in THE POWER OF 
PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 60. 
215.  Marta Laupa, et al, supra note 78, at 161-63. 
216.  See Carol Bruckner, “EXPERT LEARNING AND EQUITY ANDROGENY: 
Integrating Dynamic Groups into First Year Courses to Develop Self-Regulated 
Learning,” presentation and materials from “Active Teaching and Learning” Eleventh 
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assure both diversity and that students don’t merely choose to work with 
those with whom they have established relationships. Exercises are 
developed for all, or most of the classes in which the small groups, 
which remain constant throughout the course, work together to solve 
some problem. Frequently there are also out-of-class problems that the 
groups are assigned. For each group problem, one or more of the groups 
are required to report on their discussions and conclusions to the class. 
When group work is assigned during class time, the instructor circulates 
through the class to monitor that the group is working appropriately.217
 My experience teaching an interdisciplinary, live client clinic in 
which students represent their clients (children in dependency court 
proceedings) in teams consisting of a law student, a social work 
graduate student and a medical student or resident has convinced me 
that the students learn far more from their collaborators, and the process, 
than they could possibly have learned working alone. 
However, as anyone who has read Lord of the Flies,218 or observed 
a group of unsupervised children at play, knows group work can get 
messy and even counterproductive,219 not to mention emotionally 
harmful.   To avoid those pitfalls, and keep the group on task and really 
collaborating—as opposed to competing or engaging in “parallel 
play”—a group facilitator is required.220  In their course, Eleanor W. 
Myers and Nancy Knauer, used practitioners who, as adjunct faculty, 
met periodically with the students in small groups.221  In “Law and 
Lawyering in the Workplace,”222  Professor Sturm and I were able to 
perform that role assisted by one teaching assistant because we 
controlled the class size.  In my law school’s first year legal writing 
course, carefully selected and trained third year students, under the 
supervision of the faculty head of the program are the facilitators.  In 
live client clinics, the clinical supervisors perform this function for the 
teams of students they supervise. 
Annual Conference of the Institute for Law School Teaching, Gonzaga University 
School of Law (2004), 4-6, on file with author. 
217.    Id. 
218. WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (Perigee Trade 1959). 
219. See Jonathan Haidt, et. al., supra note 118, at 5-7. 
 220. Deborah E. Allen & Harold B. White, III, Undergraduate Group Facilitators 
to Meet the Challenges of Multiple Classroom Groups, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-
BASED LEARNING, supra  note 176, at 80-83. 
 221. Myers, supra note 37, at 407-08. 
 222. Lerner, supra note 28. 
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C.  Teaching Our Students to Avoid Downshifting 
Downshifting occurs when the situation creates too high a level of 
stress, for example, when it appears to the individual to pose an 
insoluble problem, and the risk of error is too great.  If law students are 
placed in realistic, though simulated, situations involving ethical 
dilemmas comparable to those faced by lawyers, supported in their 
efforts to solve the problem, given the opportunity to reflect on their 
work, individually, among their peers, and with supervision, so that they 
can see what worked, what did not, and why, and what other options 
might have been considered, actively encouraged to consider multiple 
perspectives and the ethical dimensions throughout the process, and 
called on to repeat that process at various points throughout law school, 
the implicit messages will be (1) that seeking and applying ethically 
correct answers is important for lawyers; (2) that these problems are 
soluble; and (3) that they are competent to solve them.  They will have 
felt the intellectual, emotional, and moral challenge of the problem.  
Likely, they will have experienced trial and error, without dire 
consequences, but rather the opportunity for reflective consideration of 
their process and others that they might have pursued.  They will be 
supported to value identifying and working towards an ethical solution 
to problems, rather than merely making an argument to achieve 
predetermined outcomes.  They will understand the relevant concepts, in 
the contexts in which they arise, and have a bank of experience to call 
on in addressing moral and ethical problems when they arise in “real 
life.”  Given such experience and knowledge as law students, they 
should be less likely to respond automatically, or to downshift, and 
more likely to engage their sophisticated cognitive powers when such 
dilemmas arise in practice. 
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D.  Adapting Problem-Based Learning to Law School 
Adapting P-BL to legal education should not be difficult.223  For 
example, Professors Eleanor W.  Myers and Nancy Knauer teach an 
“Integrated Transactional Practice Course” (ITP), in which they 
combine the teaching of Trusts and Estates and Professional 
Responsibility using “long-term, live simulations”224  The course was 
designed starting with the desired progression of the trusts and estates 
issues, then building in professional responsibility problems in a 
sequence that Myers says “developed naturally.”225  They use six client 
files, which they have attempted to make realistic.  In so doing, they 
have created the underlying “stories” of “the parties, their lawyers, their 
decisions and choices, and provide a full description of the factual 
context in which the matter arose.”226  The students grapple with the 
problems in the “first person,” experiencing the challenges, and the 
emotion of exercising discretion and judgment, and assuming personal 
responsibility.227  Throughout the course, the faculty is available as 
“mentors” to facilitate discussion of substantive, strategic and ethical 
issues.228
For many years, New York University Law School has had a first 
year course, “The Lawyering Program,” in which small groups of 
students, frequently sub-divided into smaller teams, address a series of 
problems typical of problems faced by lawyers in daily practice. 
Teaching both legal “analysis” and lawyering “skills” are goals of the 
course.  Imbedded in certain of the problems, e.g., counseling and 
 223. For an example of P-BL in non-US style (i.e., undergraduate) legal education, 
see Keith Winsor, Applying Problem-Based Learning to Practical Legal Training, in 
THE CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 224-32 (discussing 
the creation and implementation of the Practical Skills Course taught at the College of 
Law, New South Wales, Australia).  For a discussion of the use of P-BL in medical 
education, see T.J. David and Leena Patel, Adult Learning Theory, Problem Based 
Learning, And Pediatrics, 73 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDREN, 357 (October, 1997). 
In addition, Professor Myers has offered to share her “Nuts and Bolts Suggestions for 
Integrated Education” with anyone who asks. Myers, supra note 37, at 401, n. 1. 
 224. Myers, supra note 37. 
 225. Id. at 405. 
 226. Id. at 406. 
 227. Id. at 411. In order to create simulations that are realistic and emotionally 
engaging, law schools can use scripted parts for clients and witnesses played by 
professional actors or repeat performing amateurs much as medical schools use 
“standardized patients.” See Lawrence M. Grossberg, Medical Education Again 
Provides A Model For Law Schools: The Standardized Patient Becomes the 
Standardized Client, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 212 (2001). 
 228. Myers, supra note 37, at 408-10. 
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negotiating, are ethical issues.  There is detailed faculty feedback after 
each exercise.229
A less ambitious example was “Law and Lawyering In The Work 
Place,”230 in which Susan Sturm and I, using employment discrimination 
law as our subject matter, created a series of problems for each segment 
of the course.  Each problem required the application of the doctrinal 
principles covered in the current course segment and built upon the 
work done earlier in the semester.  For each, the students were required 
to act “in role” and to employ different skills that lawyers regularly use 
in representing their clients.  A number of the problems required the 
students to work collaboratively.  After each role play, we provided 
feedback to the individual students as well as to the class as a whole.  
Frequently, lawyers, or other experts (e.g., police officials, statisticians, 
women’s rights advocates, etc.) participated in the problems, and also 
provided feedback. 
The National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA) has been 
teaching trial skills to lawyers and law students for thirty years, using 
both individual problems (i.e., short, fact statements focused on a 
particular skill), and entire mock “case files” that call upon the 
“students” to read the factual material, decide on the legal and factual 
theories they will pursue, marshal the evidence and legal arguments they 
need, anticipate their adversaries theories and arguments and prepare to 
meet them, prepare their witnesses, decide upon and obtain trial 
exhibits, and then perform the trial under the scrutiny of experts, who 
provide feedback.   From the experience of the NITA model, a number 
of law schools have developed integrated courses which teach evidence, 
trial advocacy and professional responsibility.231
 229. Materials on file with author.  For examples of other first year courses in 
lawyering, which incorporate some or all of the principal elements of P-BL, see, e.g., 
Franklin M. Schultz, Teaching “Lawyering” To First Year Students: An Experiment In 
Constructing Legal Competence, 52 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 1643 (1995) (describing 
the first year lawyering course at Washington and Lee Law School); Nancy M. Maurer 
and Linda Fitts Mischler, Introduction To Lawyering: Teaching First Year Students To 
Think Like Professionals, 44 J. LEGAL ED. 96 (March, 1994) (describing the first year 
lawyering course at Albany Law School); Dean Braverman,  Law Firm: A First-Year 
Course On Lawyering, 39 J. LEGAL ED. 501 (discussing the first year lawyering course 
at Syracuse University Law School). 
 230. See Lerner, supra note 28. 
 231. I am personally familiar with the courses at Temple University’s Beasley 
School of Law, and Widener University Law School where I have participated as a 
faculty member, and the one at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where I 
teach. 
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Examples of courses which integrate problem solving with 
professional responsibility are also available.232  The Center For 
Professionalism at The University of Pennsylvania Law School 
produced videos of a number of factually complex “stories” in which 
professional responsibility issues were imbedded.  These videos were 
widely used to educate law students, lawyers, and judges.  Their model 
was to present a segment of a “story,” stop, have the audience, guided 
by a trained presenter, discuss the facts, and identify and address 
whatever ethical issues they spotted, and before moving on to the next 
segment in which the story continued.  Each segment included actual 
ethical problems and/or conduct that might well lead to such problems if 
followed.233
David Luban and Michael Millman have developed a live client 
clinical course which consciously incorporates professional 
responsibility as a for-credit element of the course.234
In his Professional Responsibility course, Douglas Frenkel 
consciously seeks to create an environment in which his students “can 
experience a situation on both intellectual and emotional planes.  [By 
placing them] in unresolved situations that are complex in terms of 
variables internal[ly] and external[ly] . . . with current facts unclear, 
future consequences undefined, and resolution susceptible to several 
choices”235  He uses problems taken from real cases, places students in 
role, and encourages collaboration among the students.236  At the 
conclusion of each problem he leads discussion and reflection among 
the class members.237
 232. See articles discussing a variety of efforts to improve the teaching of 
Professional Responsibility, including efforts to integrate that subject matter with 
various substantive courses, some with efforts to place the students “in role” such as 
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 28. 
 233. Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr. et al., Teaching Legal Ethics: Exploring the Continuum, 
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 159, 159-160 (1995). 
 234. Luban & Milman, supra note 37. 
 235. Frenkel, supra note 37, at 29. 
 236. Id. at 33, 35, 39-40; see also Carol Bruckner, supra note 241. 
 237. Id. at 41. 
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E.  When and Where to Engage the Students    
1.  Start in the First Year 
The University of California at Berkeley’s Boalt Hall Law School 
experimented with a three year program introducing legal ethics in the 
first year curriculum and then discarded the idea, opting to move the 
course to the second year, in large measure because of a combination of 
student and faculty opposition.238 Students regarded the two credit 
course as less important than their other course work, described the 
study of legal ethics as “patronizing, preachy, irrelevant, or 
intellectually soft,”239 and evaluated the instructors’ performance 
significantly below that of their other teachers.240 For their part, faculty 
felt that by including the course in the first year, students suffered 
because they lacked “exposure to relevant advanced courses” and had 
little, if any, practice experience.241  Other schools have also tried, and 
rejected, the idea.  Nevertheless, I submit that there are useful reasons 
for introducing professional responsibility into the first year curriculum. 
First, assuming that we are fighting a battle to overcome, or 
reinforce in the face of negative learning in law school, students’ social 
intuitions, the sooner we get started the better.  Three years offers more 
opportunity than two. 
Second, students arrive at law school excited to be initiated into the 
world of law and lawyering.  They are emotionally prepared to accept 
that learning from their first year courses and professors.  What we 
omit, as what we include in the first year curriculum, sends an implicit, 
but readily learned, message about what we think—no, what we 
“know”—is important for lawyers to do, and therefore for law students 
to learn.  Consequently, “it is what is imprinted in that initial immersion 
and not any broader messages of the three years, that shapes the 
students’ consciousness of what is important and not important to being 
a lawyer.”242 Again, if it is their intuitions, developed over many years, 
 238. Stephen McG. Bundy, Ethics Education in the First Year: An Experiment, 58 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 19, 25 (1995). 
 239. Id. at 27. 
 240. Id. at 25. 
 241. Id. at 28. 
 242. Lesnick, supra note 87, at 1159; see also, Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics 
Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Course in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 719, 735-36 (1998) (urging that law schools promote the importance of legal ethics 
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that we are trying to overcome or reinforce in connection with their 
roles as lawyers, we can expect them to be more open to that in the first 
year before they become jaded.  My experience with the Law & 
Lawyering In The Workplace243 course convinced me that by the end of 
one semester of law school, we have effectively inculcated in our 
students the “three principles” of legal problem solving.  Thereafter, it is 
difficult to get them to “unlearn” that process or to supplement it with 
broader considerations that are necessary for the problem solving 
necessary in representing clients in the practice of law. 
Surely the first year curriculum is important and crowded.  Yet, I 
know of no evidence that teaching first year students to engage in 
creative problem solving would interfere with their learning traditional 
legal analysis.  I also know of no evidence that a first semester, or first 
year, of law school which devoted less than 100% of course time to 
teaching only the traditional approach to legal problem solving would, 
in any manner or degree, impair law students’ analytical abilities, or 
other functioning as lawyers.  Hence, I must conclude that teaching 
broad based problem solving techniques in the first year would be a 
valuable addition to the legal education of our students. 
Problems of design for the inclusion of professional responsibility 
in the first year curriculum can be overcome.  Deborah Rhode,244 Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow,245 and others have developed such materials.  
Moreover, faculty who teach in the first year curriculum are certainly 
capable of learning to use such materials in order to make their 
inclusion meaningful, and effective.246
2.  Teach Pervasively 
Deborah Rhode argues that law students can best understand by 
having ethical issues arise in all of their courses.247  Her position is 
supported by the recent research on memory, discussed above in Part II.   
by making it a required, three credit, first year, first semester course and an upper level 
course as well, and also incorporate ethics into all courses). 
 243. See discussion, supra note 28. 
 244. See generally RHODE, supra note 16. 
 245. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 186. 
 246. Note that in the second and third year iterations of its first year professional 
responsibility course,  Boalt Hall added problems drawn from practice, role plays, small 
group work, increased faculty feed back and role plays explicitly tied to development of 
lawyering skills. As a result, students’ reaction to the course, and teacher evaluations 
dramatically improved. Bundy, supra note 238, at 26-27. 
 247. RHODE, supra note 16, at 4-5. 
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Moreover, as we have seen, understanding, and learning to apply the 
transferability of learning requires that we teach it in multiple 
contexts.248  Professional responsibility problems arise in every type of 
practice, in every subject matter, and perhaps every day, for lawyers.  If 
we want law students to be prepared to recognize and address ethical 
issues as part of their every day practice of law those problems should 
present themselves as part of their “everyday” legal education in order 
that elaborately encoded implicit memory for those experiences is 
created.  If students encountered ethical issues in five different courses, 
they would have the opportunity of recognizing them in five different 
contexts.  Engaging with ethical issues under the tutelage of five 
different professors is also likely to produce a much richer learning 
experience than doing so with only one. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
“A rational approach to curriculum design would begin with an 
assessment of the law school’s mission and of the kind of student we 
wish to train and would then attempt to divine an appropriate blend and 
sequence law, institutions, skills, perspectives and professional 
issues.”249 For many years, the legal profession has recognized that the 
kind of lawyers that clients, the profession, and the community needs, 
are those who can carry out their professional responsibilities as 
representatives of their clients, officers of the judicial system, and 
public citizens exercising moral and ethical judgment of the highest 
order.250  Unfortunately, most law schools have either not accepted as a 
significant part of their mission the role of training law students for that 
practice mode, or otherwise ignored Professor Gorman’s admonition.251 
Consequently, prevalent law school curriculum and pedagogy are not 
well suited to producing lawyers well equipped for either role.  Seeing 
this, many law professors have experimented with course design and 
delivery seeking to impart these traits and practices to their students.  
Recent discoveries in social psychology and neuroscience demonstrate 
rather clearly that a pedagogy based upon contextually rich, emotionally 
engaging, role-based, problem solving, coupled with ongoing reflective 
 248. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 62-63, 68-69.
 249. Robert A. Gorman, Introduction, Curriculum Developments: A Symposium, 39 
J. LEG. ED. 469 (December 1989). 
 250. MODEL RULES, Preamble. 
 251. Gorman, supra note 249, at 469. 
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discourse is most likely to significantly enhance law students’ effective 
engagement with, and mastery of, the role of ethical practitioner.  It is 
now up to us to engage that learning in our teaching. 
